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I. INTRODUCTION
A destination gaming resort is a large hotel strategically located in a desir-
able resort location that offers fine dining, exceptional entertainment, fashiona-
ble facilities and atmosphere, luxury furnishings and services, numerous
recreational activities, and features legal gaming.  Unlike more modest gaming
businesses, destination gaming resorts emphasize both hotel and gaming opera-
tions.  As a result of this dual emphasis, destination gaming resorts are notable
for the scale of their investment in real property, which is often in the billions
of dollars.  These businesses invest in real property to derive income attributa-
ble to payments received from mere occupancy, services related to occupancy,
and wagering or gaming activities.1  In this fashion, they combine real prop-
erty, services, and gaming based lines of business.  By combining fees for the
use of real property with services and gaming, destination gaming resorts hold
assets and derive income that is, for federal income tax purposes, a mixture of
passive and active.2
In simple terms, passive income is a type of income that represents a con-
stant increase in wealth owing to passive accumulation.  Passive accumulation
is an accession to wealth that accrues without a taxpayer’s exertion or sacrifice
and is therefore primarily the result of economic conditions beyond a tax-
payer’s immediate control.  Common examples of passive income include
merely receiving interest income, royalty income, dividend income, rents from
real property, and amounts hotel guests pay for mere occupancy.  In contrast to
passive income, taxpayers derive active income from their work or economy, a
product of substantial management, operation, exertion, or sacrifice.  In particu-
lar, a destination gaming resort’s real property dedicated to passive business
and passive sources of income3 demand most of its capital investment in real
property and represents a distinct area where significant but not exclusively
passive income is realized.4  In such areas, they realize predominantly passive
1 In the case of destination gaming resorts, its facilities produce income from supplying
guests with both occupancy and services (of both a personal and general nature).  The former
represents payment from guests for the use of real property, while the latter represents pay-
ment from the same guests for the enjoyment of general facility services, hospitality services
and gaming. See infra note 12.
2 For purposes of this article, a reference to passive income or qualifying income means real
property rents and other real estate investment trust permissible income sources set out in 26
U.S.C. § 856(d)(1)-(2), (d)(7) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) and Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4 (as
amended in 1981), while a reference to active income or non-qualifying income means
income that is other than a passive income source.  Similarly, passive assets and passive real
property refer to real estate assets where predominantly passive business occurs (and other
property qualifying under 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(4) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) such as the hotel
tower, while active assets and active real property refer to all assets that do not qualify as
passive assets (such as the gaming business and those portions of the real property where
gaming is conducted).  Additionally, passive business refers to the process of earning passive
income, while the term active business refers to the process of earning active income.  Nota-
bly, investment in passive real property often contains within it opportunities for active busi-
ness.  Income that would constitute a prohibited transaction under 26 U.S.C. § 857(b)(6)
(2006 & Supp. II 2008) is treated as neither a passive or active source.
3 For example, its hotel or retail component and general services. See infra note 12.
4 Such as charges for mere occupancy, general services and triple net rents for retail space.
Non-real estate investment trust tax rules typically distinguish between passive mere rental
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-1\NVG103.txt unknown Seq: 3 13-JUN-11 8:40
Spring 2011] REIT INVESTMENT 49
income, but also realize lesser yet significant active income.  Consequently, the
passive real property components of a destination gaming resort are those dis-
tinct segments of the property that yield predominantly, but not exclusively,
passive income.5  Destination gaming resorts focus equally on active business,
in the form of gaming and personal services, and passive business, when gam-
ing revenues are more or less offset by revenues from non-gaming hotel, con-
ference, convention, recreation, retail, and entertainment related facilities.6
II. CONSEQUENCES OF DEMAND FOR SUBSTANTIAL CAPITAL
INVESTMENT IN PASSIVE REAL PROPERTY
Gaming resorts on this scale require a massive capital investment, largely
to fund their sizable passive real property aspects.  In order to acquire the funds
needed to invest in real property on this scale, these businesses are or will
commonly become publicly traded, allowing them to issue liquid publicly
traded debt7 and equity but coming at the cost of being taxable as a Subchapter
“C” corporation as to all of their active and passive business.8  As detailed
below, becoming taxable as a Subchapter “C” corporation is detrimental
income and income received in an active trade of renting property by whether the taxpayer
supplies significant services and incurs significant costs in management and operation.
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(2)(iii), (b)(2)(iv) (as amended in 1989); Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-
2T(b)(3) (as amended in 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.1362-2(c)(5) (1992).  However, the defini-
tion of passive and active income for real estate investment trusts is sui generis (with passive
income a substantially broader concept), including a history of treating hotel-type income’s
active and passive components as severable.  Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(a) (as enacted in 1962 by
T.D. 6598, 1962-1 C.B. 105). See infra Part IV.A.
5 Separated into distinct components, the active real property of a destination gaming resort
comprises those portions of the property where predominantly active business is conducted,
such as the gaming floor.  Given the luxury market, personal service and short-term occu-
pancy focused nature of the business, there are few or no areas where the business derived is
exclusively passive in nature.  For instance, the hotel tower is predominantly passive real
property, but significant active business is also realized there, such as personal services like
room service.  Some destination gaming resorts realize exclusively passive business in their
retail areas, when they hire sufficiently unrelated management, supply only customary gen-
eral services and resort to triple net lease arrangements. See infra Part IV.A.
6 See, e.g., MGM MIRAGE ANN. REP. 29-30 (2008); WYNN RESORTS ANN. REP. 43-47
(2008). Cf., Kisang Ryu & Shawn Jang, Performance Measurement Through Cash Flow
Ratios and Traditional Ratios: A Comparison of Commercial and Casino Hotel Companies,
12 J. HOSPITALITY FIN. MGMT 15, at 19 (2004).
7 Businesses also use asset-backed debt financing arrangements for real property capital.
However, customary covenants and excessive debt loads limit the firm’s capacity to respond
to changing economic circumstances or increased competition and may expose the firm to
high interest expenses.  Still, it may be tax advantageous to capitalize with reasonable levels
of debt, as opposed to purely shareholder capital because only debt supports interest deduc-
tions.  For these reasons, it is likely that operators use a blend of asset-backed debt and,
when traded, issues of stock or debt securities.
8 Businesses organized as corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships, or trusts
may become a public company (becoming a business readily traded on a secondary market
or traded on an established securities market); doing so subjects them to taxation as if they
were Subchapter “C” corporations under special rules that convert non-corporate status into
corporate status for tax purposes.  This special rule applies unless the publicly traded busi-
ness’ income is overwhelmingly passive in nature.  26 U.S.C. §§ 7704(a), (c)-(d) (2006 &
Supp. II 2008), 301, 11(a), 311, 336 (2006), 1362(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2006 & Supp. I  2007).
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because it imposes double taxation on firm income.9  In many cases, the drive
to become publicly traded is substantially attributable to the passive real prop-
erty’s demand for capital investment, which greatly exceeds the capital invest-
ment in active real property.10  In this way, a destination gaming resort’s
demand for capital investment in passive real property pushes it into becoming
publicly traded, dragging all of its income, active and passive, into tax ineffi-
cient Subchapter “C.”  Clearly, these businesses find the tax penalty of Sub-
chapter “C” sufficiently offset by the liquidity and otherwise cost-effective
access to capital (both debt and equity) available from being traded on a public
market.11
The consequences of excessive capital investment in real property are
widely recognized, even if publicly traded.  Like other capital-intensive indus-
tries, destination gaming resorts are aware of the benefits of monetizing their
capital investment and aim to reduce the amount of capital trapped in the real
property necessary to their business operations, particularly their cash intensive
passive real property.  However, destination gaming resorts have not developed
wholly effective strategies in this regard.12  This is likely due to the sheer scale
of these businesses, the fear of losing control over assets critical to business
success, and the considerable regulatory overlay these businesses are subject
9 See infra note 29.  Additionally, the long-term preferential rate for individuals is unavaila-
ble to Subchapter “C” corporations; they are taxed on capital gains at regular corporate rates.
26 U.S.C. §§ 1(h) (2006 & Supp. II 2008), 11 (2006).
10 See supra note 7.  The areas comprising the passive real property are substantially larger
than the areas comprising the active real property (compare, for example, the gross floor area
of the hotel tower and the gaming floor).  The use and allocation of space at gaming proper-
ties is tightly controlled, commonly forcing substantial additional investment in passive real
property for even modest increases in core active real property.  Additional passive real
property requires additional capital investment, but is potentially resolved by directly acces-
sing the public markets for cost effective replacement capital (excepting the tax efficiency
cost). Compare, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-80.1(b), (c), 5:12-80.2 (a), (b) (West 2011),
with N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-83(a), (c)-(d), 5:12-82(b)(1) (West 2011). Cf., James
O’Donnel, Seoki Lee & Wesley S. Roehl, Economics of Scale and the Atlantic City Casino
Industry, 1 INT’L CHRIE CONF. REFEREED TRACK (2009), http://scholarworks.umass.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=jhfm.
11 When stock values are elevated, becoming publicly traded is used as both a capital raising
arrangement and a monetization strategy for business founders.  Depending on the extent to
which founders exit the business and raise capital, the transaction may represent the
exchange of private investment in capital intensive real property for public market invest-
ment, at the cost of taxation under Subchapter “C” as to all active and passive income.
12 Although their options are limited by the need to maintain a desired guest experience
throughout the resort, they may monetize retail components by selling them for cash. See,
e.g., Las Vegas Sands Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-4) 152-153 (June 7, 2005)
(describing the sale of the Grand Canal Shoppes retail area at the Venetian Resort, Las
Vegas, NV).  As an alternative, they may develop condominium-hotels.  A condominium
hotel is a hotel in which an investor takes title to a specific hotel room but which remains
generally available in a resort managed rental pool. See, e.g., Jennifer Shubinski, Develop-
ers Offering a New Kind of Suite Deal With Condo-Hotels, LAS VEGAS SUN, Jan. 2, 2006,
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2006/jan/02/developers-offering-a-new-kind-of-suite-
deal-with-/; Mike Schneider, Hotel Condo is Growing Trend in U.S., LAS VEGAS SUN, June
6, 2005, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2005/jun/06/hotel-condo-hybrid-is-growing-
trend-in-us/; Michael Corkery, Sara Lin and Ruth Simon, Rooms With a Bubble View, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 5, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120735504829291471.html.
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to.13  Notwithstanding that destination gaming resorts sooner or later acquire
funding on the public capital markets, the capital-intensive nature of these busi-
nesses continues to pose a significant business challenge, particularly when
funded with excess debt, and imposes undesirable tax outcomes when it drags
the entire business into tax inefficient Subchapter “C.”  Despite the storied
evolution of gaming businesses from modest origins into large enterprises oper-
ating destination gaming resorts with direct access to public markets, the mas-
sive amount of capital investment now essential to, and trapped within, their
underlying and predominantly passive real property poses a significant business
challenge.  However, the scale of the business and severability of the passive
real property may permit novel solutions, including restructuring all or some of
their passive real property investment using a real estate investment trust
(“REIT”) based transaction14 as part of a broader strategy to avoid being drag-
ged into undesirable Subchapter “C” taxation.
III. POTENTIAL USE OF REITS TO MONETIZE DESTINATION GAMING
RESORT INVESTMENT IN PASSIVE REAL PROPERTY
Technically, REITs are tax corporations through which shareholders
derive income from debt and/or equity investments in real property in a passive
but federal income tax-efficient manner.  Corporations began electing REIT
status shortly after the authorizing legislation appeared in 1960.  Modeled on
mutual funds, REITs originated as a method by which individuals with or with-
out significant assets could invest in real property.15  A REIT based transaction
is not the only way a destination gaming resort can address, by monetizing, its
existing capital investment in real property, but a REIT’s access to public mar-
kets and inherent tax efficiency make it a presumptively optimal acquirer or
joint venture partner.16  REITs are poised to become an even more attractive
structuring option for large real property based businesses for two principal
reasons.  First, a body of administrative authority suggests that many of the
restrictions that make uneconomic REIT involvement in the passive real prop-
13 See supra note 12.  This article does not consider the effects, if any, of segmenting desti-
nation gaming resort real property, assets and income under state and local law, including
gaming regulations.
14 Some experts have proposed that gaming businesses monetize their investment in real
property through a REIT involved lease restructuring. See, e.g., Developments, Double or
Nothing, REAL ESTATE PORTFOLIO, May/June 2007, http://www.nareit.com/portfoliomag/07
mayjun/dev1.shtml.
15 See infra note 43.
16 REITs enjoy inherent acquisitional advantages and tax efficiencies that tolerate their pay-
ing premium prices for assets, making them presumptively optimal acquirors or joint venture
partners.  Differences in tax rates reflecting tax advantages or disadvantages are sometimes
priced into an asset’s value, by a process economists term tax capitalization.  In the case of
publicly traded entities (like many REITs), the theory holds that a corporation that is freed
from a corporate level tax will exhibit a rise in its share value attributable to the elimination
of the corporate level tax expense (since the net return derived from holding its equity
increases as a result of the removal of the tax). RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUS-
GRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 259-60 (5th ed. 1984). See also STE-
PHEN G. UTZ, TAX POLICY – AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL DEBATE 21-
22 (1993).
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erty of businesses that blend active and passive income can be overcome or
managed through partnership based operating structures.17  Second, the relative
tax efficiency of REIT arrangements is anticipated to double in 2013.18
REITs enjoy substantial federal income tax advantages compared to other
widely available real property investment vehicles.  Unlike Subchapter “C”
corporations, REITs avoid taxation on their distributed earnings.19  In other
words, a REIT’s income is taxed only to its shareholders, provided it is distrib-
uted.20  This contrasts sharply with “C’ corporations, which are taxed on their
income and whose shareholders are taxed again on their receipt of the after-tax
remainder.21  When the effective rate of tax applicable to “C” corporations and
their shareholders is contrasted with the rate applicable to REIT shareholders
under federal income tax provisions applicable to tax year 2010, a REIT inves-
tor only pays at his marginal rate.22  Consequently, REIT shareholders in the
top marginal bracket pay at a 35% rate on the REIT distribution,23 an amount
less than the approximately 44% combined rate of the “C” corporation24 and its
shareholder (on a qualified dividend25), a tax efficiency difference favoring the
REIT by about 10%.  However, when the George W. Bush-era tax rate cuts
expire, the difference between a REIT investor’s rate and the top marginal
income tax rate becomes approximately 21%, more than doubling the REIT
structure’s relative tax efficiency (on dividends).26  These circumstances indi-
cate that destination gaming resort businesses that are already tax pass-throughs
should not expect to ameliorate their federal income tax efficiency by accessing
17 See infra Part IV.C.
18 See infra note 28.
19 26 U.S.C. §§ 11(c)(3) (2006), 857(b)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
20 Id. §§ 11(c)(3), 561 (2006), 857(b) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
21 Id. §§ 11(a), 61(a)(7), 301(a), (c) (2006).
22 Id. §§ 61(a)(7), 11(c)(3) (2006), 857(b) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.857-6(b)
(as amended in 1986).  In limited cases, REITs issue capital gain dividends that are taxed at
the current long term capital gains rate of 15%.  26 U.S.C. §§ 1, 857(b)(3)(B) (2006 & Supp.
II 2008).
23 Id. §§ 1(i)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008), 61(a)(7) (2006).
24 Id. § 11(b) (2006).
25 Id. §§ 1(h)(11) (2006 & Supp. II 2008), 61(a)(7) (2006).  REIT distributions are generally
ineligible for treatment as a 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(11) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) qualified dividend
since a REIT is not taxed as a corporation. Id. § 1(h)(11)(D) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
26 The George W. Bush era tax cuts arose under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001, H.R. 1836, 107th Cong., Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38
(2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) and were broadened and
accelerated under the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, H.R. 2, 108th Cong.,
Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).  As enacted, these laws were set to sunset at the end of 2010.  H.R. 1836,
§ 901(a)(1).  Together, these enactments reduced individual income tax rates to 10%, 15%,
25%, 28%, 33% and 35%, from 15%, 28%, 31%, 36% and 39.6%, while certain 26 U.S.C.
§ 1(h)(11) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) qualified dividends became taxed at 5% and 15% (when
the provisions sunset, the latter rates are scheduled to return and dividends will once again be
taxed as ordinary income at a taxpayer’s marginal rate).  However, these tax rates were
extended until the end of 2012.  Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and
Job Creation Act, H.R. 4853, 111th Cong., Pub. L. No. 111-312, §§ 101-102, 124 Stat. 3296,
3298-99 (2010).  This article does not consider any taxes imposed under the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong., Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
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REIT tax efficiency as to their passive real property; however when a “C”
corporation, or when publicly listed, or about to be publicly listed, a REIT
structure may preserve significantly more tax efficient arrangements, as it fur-
thers the monetization of a substantial capital investment in real property.27
Generally, businesses that have invested substantial capital in passive real
estate can monetize28 (in the sense of reducing to cash or a liquid near
equivalent) their existing investment directly, through a sale-leaseback transac-
tion involving a REIT, or less directly, through a transfer for liquid REIT
equity (or its economic equivalent).  Fully monetizing a passive real property
investment frees up capital and allows them to focus their energy and resources
on primary active businesses and assets.29  However, any sale-leaseback or
transfer for REIT equity transaction must preserve the viability of any depen-
dent and intertwined active and passive businesses (here, both aspects are
essential to the unique experience and luxury atmosphere the resort is predi-
cated on and that is demanded by guests).30  A not-yet-publicly-traded destina-
tion gaming resort can monetize its capital investment in real property in a tax
efficient manner through a REIT based transaction, preserving for its founders
its active business in a tax efficient form instead of forcing a public listing
transaction that drags all aspects of the business, passive and active, into tax-
disadvantageous Subchapter “C”.  Moreover, because destination gaming
resorts combine separable passive real property and active real property, they
represent a unique opportunity for a REIT acquisition.31  In theory, a REIT
could acquire all or some of the property, leasing it entirely to a sufficiently
unrelated gaming operator (hereinafter, an “operator lease”), or it can acquire
only its passive real property components, limiting itself to passive business
27 Pass-through entities, such as tax partnerships (including limited liability companies
taxed as partnerships), normally enjoy greater tax efficiency than Subchapter “C” corpora-
tions, for three principal reasons.  First, they are not separate taxpaying entities, which per-
mits them to distribute their earnings without reduction for an entity level tax. See 26 U.S.C.
§§ 701, 702, 11(a), 1363(a)-(b), 301(a), (c), 302(e)(5) (2006).  Second, they enjoy a prefer-
ential rate on their long-term capital gains that is not available to Subchapter “C’ corpora-
tions. See id. §§ 1(h), 857 (2006 & Supp. II 2008), 11(a) (2006).  Third, they are able to
allocate tax losses to their equity investors (in contrast to Subchapter “C” corporations,
whose losses are isolated within the entity). See id. §§ 705, 302(e)(5), 1363(a), 311(b)
(2006), 857 (2006 & Supp. II  2008).
28 Deardorffs’ Glossary of International Economics, Monetize, http://www-personal.umich.
edu/~alandear/glossary/m.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2011).
29 This applies to real property based enterprises whose focus is not developing and repeat-
edly disposing of real estate.
30 See supra note 14.
31 See 26 U.S.C. § 7704(a)-(b) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.7704-1(a)(1) (as
amended in 1995); Treas. Reg. § 1.7701(l)-3 (as amended in 2000).  They may also be
attractive to certain publicly traded partnerships.  They are not taxed as “C’ corporations
(unlike other publicly traded partnerships) but as tax partnerships, provided their income is at
least 90% passive under criteria set out in 26 U.S.C. § 7704(c) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
However, if they cannot satisfy the passive income requirement, they are taxed under Sub-
chapter “C’. See id. § 7704(c)-(d) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  Under 26 U.S.C. § 7704(d)(1)-
(4) (2006 & Supp. II 2008), permitted passive sources include real property rents as provided
in 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(1)-(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) but without regard to the independent
contractor rules set out in 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(7)(C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). Id.
§ 7704(c)(3) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). See supra note 10.
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from directly supplying accommodation and certain services to guests (herein-
after “direct operation”).  Yet, to date, no destination gaming resort business
has been restructured to involve a REIT in either way.
The absence of REIT involvement in destination gaming resort businesses
is principally attributable to the REIT qualification requirements, and the eco-
nomic constraints they impose on resorts featuring gaming.  Generally, these
requirements place strict limits on business structure and operation, as they
constrain or eliminate a REIT’s ability to engage in active business (forcing
REITs to act predominantly as passive investors in real property and to use
substantially unrelated suppliers for any active business, aside from a limited
amount realizable through taxable subsidiaries32).  As a general matter, the
degree to which the REIT qualification rules would burden the acquisition of
real property is primarily a function of the amount, and type, of income it
would yield.  This, in turn, determines whether it can be arranged with direct
operation, or whether REIT involvement is limited to an operating lease.  For
those few properties that combine substantial amounts of separable active and
passive business, the potential for a REIT to directly realize their passive com-
ponents is a function of the amount of active business remaining at the severed
passive real property.33  In these cases, under conventional structuring
approaches not involving leases to taxable subsidiaries, direct involvement
depends on whether the value of the net active business required to be con-
ducted in taxable subsidiaries would exceed 25% of the value of all REIT
assets (after reduction for a de minimis amount of unconstrained active
income)34 and whether distributions out of these subsidiaries would cause the
REIT to fail certain tests predicated on sufficient passive real property based
income.35  If a REIT is unable or unwilling to directly realize these passive
business components, its involvement is limited to acquiring the property and
acting as lessor to an unrelated operator (such as a through a sale-leaseback).
However, where the real property is a hospitality facility with gaming, its pas-
sive real property contains significant active business (owing to its personal
services intensive qualities).36  Here, the active business remaining at the pas-
sive real property could overwhelm these general limits, but even if it would
not, special qualification rules preclude isolating gaming property active busi-
ness in a taxable subsidiary.  Furthermore, these special rules prevent REITs
from leasing the property to their subsidiaries (which, when available, can filter
hotel income to the REIT in tax efficient fashion).37
32 See infra Part IV.A-B. Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 269B (2006) (comparing to stapled entities).
33 Or, to a lesser extent, whether its passive but not real property based qualifying income
exceeds 25% of its gross income.  Directly realizable customary services income is effec-
tively unlimited. See infra Part IV.A.
34 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(3), (c)(4)(B)(ii), (d)(1)-(2), (d)(7), (l)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  For
tax years ending on or before December 31, 2008, the effective limit was 20%. See infra
Part IV.A-B and note 153.
35 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(3) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
36 See supra notes 3 and 7.  Given its excess of active income, a destination gaming resort
cannot directly qualify as a REIT.
37 See 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(2), (c)(4)(B)(ii), (d)(1)-(2), (d)(7), (d)(9)(D), (l)(1) (2006 & Supp.
II 2008). See infra Part IV.A-B.
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These limits represent an inherent economic disadvantage requiring the
REIT to forgo directly or indirectly realizing the active business remaining at
the passive real property, effectively limiting its involvement to an operator
lease.38  Moreover, aside from these limits on gaming properties under the
REIT tax rules, because the active and passive aspects of a destination gaming
resort are dependent and intertwined, introducing an unrelated operator into its
passive real property components is undesirable (this limits the REIT’s operator
lease to a sale-leaseback).  However, the relative clarity of administrative pro-
nouncements on the subsidiary partnerships of REITs, combined with long-
standing property law, suggests a method through which a REIT may engage in
direct operation of the passive real property of a destination gaming resort with-
out introducing economic or business penalties for the REIT or resort.  This
partnership arrangement is an alternative to customary structures that limit
REIT involvement to the sale-leaseback version of operator leases.  Conse-
quently both direct operation, using a special partnership arrangement, and the
sale leaseback form of operator lease, allow destination gaming resorts to mon-
etize an existing passive real property investment, and permit them to retain the
active aspects of their business in tax efficient form without necessarily intro-
ducing business disadvantages, results that are unavailable if the business
becomes publicly traded as a whole and taxed as a Subchapter “C”
corporation.39
These conclusions depend, in many parts, on analogies and inferences
drawn from available administrative materials; because REITs are cautious,
they typically seek tax rulings before adopting a novel business structure
(which supplies a wealth of administrative insight but little precedent).  It is
important here to emphasize that making an intelligent business decision on
whether to consider any REIT involved arrangement depends on integrating
business, financial and tax analysis that is necessarily unique to each business.
IV. REIT QUALIFICATION RULES AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE AVAILABILITY
OF REIT BASED MONETIZATION TRANSACTIONS
A. REIT Qualification Rules
Technically, a REIT is a corporation, trust, or association that has made a
REIT election.40  To validly make and maintain this election, the entity must
satisfy numerous requirements.41  An entity making a REIT election must sat-
isfy the following organizational tests: (i) the entity must be organized as a
38 See infra Part IV.B.
39 In cases where the destination gaming resort is already publicly traded, with some adjust-
ments, the arrangement might also serve to offset a sunken capital investment in passive real
property as a prelude to a leveraged buy-out or other “going private” transaction as to its
active business aspects.  For planned destination gaming resort businesses, this arrangement
might serve as the basis for a co-venture through which the REIT supplied needed capital
investment in passive real property, allowing the destination gaming resort business to
remain privately held in tax efficient form.
40 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(b) (as amended in
1981).
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(a) (as amended in 1981).  The original legislation permitting REIT
elections was part of An Act to Amend the Internal Revenue Code With Respect to Excise
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corporation, trust, or association;42 (ii) the entity must be managed by one or
more trustee(s) or director(s);43 (iii) the entity must issue transferable shares or
certificates;44 (iv) the entity must qualify to be taxed as a domestic corporation
(determined as if the REIT election was not in effect);45 and (v) the entity must
have at least one hundred shareholders and cannot be closely held under appli-
cable guidance.46  Finally, the organizational tests require that the entity (i) not
constitute a financial institution or insurance company for tax purposes,47 (ii)
have in effect a valid REIT election,48 and (iii) comply with several REIT spe-
cific record-keeping requirements.49
In addition, the entity must satisfy operational tests,50 which are tests as to
the source and distribution of its income, and as to the amount and nature of its
assets.  The operational tests require that: (i) at least 75% of the value of the
entity’s assets constitute real property assets,51 cash,52 cash items,53 or govern-
ment securities54 (hereinafter the “Asset(s) Test”);55 (ii) no more than 25% of
the value of entity’s assets constitute securities of any issuer (other than securi-
ties permitted under the Assets Test);56 (iii) no more than 25% of the value of
Taxes on Cigars, H.R. 10960, 86th Cong., Pub. L. No. 86-779, 74 Stat. 998, 1003-04 (1960)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). H.R. REP. NO. 86-2020 (1960).
42 26 U.S.C. § 856(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). See also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (as
amended in 2009); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4 (as amended in 1996).
43 26 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(b)(1), (d)(1) (as
amended in 1981).
44 26 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(b)(2), (d)(2) (as
amended in 1981).
45 26 U.S.C. § 856(a)(3) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(b)(3) (as amended
in 1981).
46 26 U.S.C. § 856(a)(5)-(6), (h) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(b)(6)-(7),
(d)(5) (as amended in 1981).  To identify REITs with excessively concentrated ownership,
the rules incorporate (after modification) the personal holding company test of 26 U.S.C.
§ 542(a)(2) (2006) and the stock attribution rules of 26 U.S.C. §§ 544 (2006) and 856(h)(1)
(2006 & Supp. II 2008) [hereinafter “The 5-50 Rule”].
47 Id. § 856(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(b)(5) (as amended in
1981).
48 26 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2), (c)(1), (g) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). See Treas. Reg. § 1.856-8
(1981).
49 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 856(f)(1), (k), 857(f) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.857-8 (as
amended in 1981).
50 26 U.S.C. § 856(a)(7), (c) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
51 Id. § 856(c)(4)(A), (c)(5)(A)-(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(d) (as
amended in 1981); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(a)-(b), (d) (as amended in 1992).
52 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(4)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). See also Rev. Rul. 72-7,1 1972-1 C.B.
99; Rev. Rul. 77-59, 1977-1 C.B. 196.
53 Such as non-purchased receivables and certificates of deposit.  26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(4)(A)
(2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(d)(3) (as amended in 1981).
54 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(4)(A), (c)(5)(F) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2006);
15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-2(16) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 111-203 effective July 21,
2010).
55 26 U.S.C. § 856(a)(7), (c)(4)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
56 Id. § 856(c)(4)(B)(i), (c)(5)(F) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  The term securities does not
include interests in real property within the definition of 26 U.S.C. § 856 (2006 & Supp. II
2008), including partnership interests, securities held in partnership solution (where suffi-
cient passive real property assets and income exist), and certain partnership issued securities
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the entity’s assets consists of the securities of its taxable REIT subsidiaries;57
(iv) the entity does not have more than 5% of the value of its total assets in
securities issued by any one issuer (not counting any securities of taxable REIT
subsidiaries, government securities, or securities includable in the Assets
Test);58 (v) the entity does not own 10% or more of the value of the total
outstanding securities issued by any one issuer (not counting the value of any
taxable REIT subsidiary securities owned and not counting government securi-
ties),59 and (vi) the entity does not hold more than 10% of the total voting
power of the outstanding securities of any one issuer (not counting those of any
taxable REIT subsidiaries or government securities, and not counting securities
that are includable in the Assets Test).60
Moreover, the operational tests require that: (i) at least 75% percent of the
entity’s gross taxable income61 consists of rents from real property,62 gains
from dispositions of real property,63 distributions from other REITs,64 interest
on obligations secured by land, interests in land or improvements to land,65
income from foreclosure property,66 or other specified income67 (hereinafter
the “75% Income Test”); and (ii) at least 95% of the entity’s gross taxable
income consists of rents from real property,68 gains from real property disposi-
tions,69 distributions from other REITs (such as dividends),70 interest,71 income
from foreclosure property,72 dividends,73 and gains from stock and security
held (but limited to the extent of the REITs’ interest in the partnership). Id. § 856(m)(3)-(4)
(2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(e) (as amended in 1992).
57 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(4)(B)(ii) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  “Securities” for this purpose is
defined by reference to 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(5)(F) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
58 Id. § 856(c)(4)(B)(iii), (c)(4)(B)(iii)(I) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
59 Id. § 856(c)(4)(B)(iii)(III) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-
34-054 (Aug. 23, 2002).  Value for purposes of this rule is determined without regard to
whether the securities have voting rights.  26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(4)(B)(iii)(III) (2006 & Supp. II
2008). Cf., S. REP. NO. 106-201, at 57 (1999).
60 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(4)(B)(iii)(II) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
61 Excluding income from certain prohibited transactions.  26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(3) (2006 &
Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(c) (as amended in 1981).
62 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(3)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  Rents from real property are defined
in 26 U.S.C. § 856(d) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
63 Including gains from disposing of certain interests in real property (other than inventory)
and interests in mortgages, or gains from the sale of the shares of other REITs. Id.
§ 856(c)(3)(C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
64 Only dividends from other REITs constitute qualifying income for purposes of the 75%
Income Test. Id. § 856(c)(3)(D) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
65 Id. § 856(c)(3)(F) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
66 Id.
67 These other sources are abatements or refunds of property taxes, certain loan commitment
fees, gains on real property from the prohibited transactions safe-harbor, and qualified tem-
porary investment income, as permitted by 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(3)(E), (c)(3)(G)-(I), (c)(5)(D)
(2006 & Supp. II 2008).
68 Id. § 856(c)(2)(C), (d)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
69 Id. § 856(c)(2)(D) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
70 Id. § 856(c)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
71 Id. § 856(c)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-5(a) (as amended in
1981).
72 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(2)(F) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
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dispositions74 (hereinafter the “95% Income Test”).75  Finally, the operational
tests require that the entity distribute at least 90% of its REIT taxable income
each year and 90% of its net after tax foreclosure property income if it has any
(after reduction for any excess non-cash income)76 and preclude the entity from
holding any earnings and profits that were accumulated in a year it was not
qualified as a REIT.77
A key requirement is the definition of real property assets for the purposes
of the Assets Test.  The term includes real property,78 mortgages on land and
improvements,79 shares of stock and certificates of beneficial interest in other
REITs, certain temporary investments,80 and certain interests in real estate
mortgage investments conduits.81  Importantly, real property assets are deemed
to include a REIT’s proportionate interest in real property owned by partner-
ships in which the REIT is a partner.82  For purposes of the Assets Test, all
interests in real estate are real property assets;83 accordingly, fee ownership, co-
ownership, leaseholds and analogues thereto, and options to purchase land or
improvements to land or leaseholds count as real property in determining the
satisfaction of the Assets Test.84  Although real property assets are deemed to
include inherently permanent structures85 and building structural compo-
nents,86 accessories to the operation of a business are not real property for
73 Dividends from any source qualify for purposes of the 95% Income Test. Id.
§ 856(c)(2)(A), (c)(3)(D) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
74 The stock, securities and real property disposed of cannot constitute inventory property
within 26 U.S.C. § 1221(a)(1) (2006). Id. § 856(c)(2)(D) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
75 Id. § 856(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4 (as amended in 1981).
Other qualifying sources include abatements and refunds of property taxes, gains on real
property within a prohibited transactions safe harbor, and loan commitment fees.  26 U.S.C.
§ 856(c)(2)(E), (c)(2)(G)-(H) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  Certain mineral royalty income
earned by timber REITs is treated as qualifying income for purposes of the 95% Income
Test. Id. § 856(c)(2)(I), (c)(5)(I) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  The remaining 5% of REIT
income is unrestricted; it may be passive or active, and based on real property or non-real
property assets. See infra note 100.
76 26 U.S.C. § 857(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. II  2008).
77 Id. § 857(a)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.857-11 (as amended in 2000).
78 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(5)(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(c)-(d), (f) (as
amended in 1992).  These are real property interests such as leaseholds, land, improvements
and certain building components.  The phrase also includes co-ownership interests but does
not include oil or gas royalty interests.  26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(5)(C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
79 Id. § 856(c)(5)(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Rev. Rul. 76-101, 1976-1 C.B. 186; Rev. Rul.
77-459, 1977-2 C.B. 239.
80 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(5)(C)-(D)(ii) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
81 Id. §§ 856(c)(5)(C)-(D) (2006 & Supp. II 2008), 860A-860G (2006).
82 Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g). See also Rev. Proc. 2003-65, 2003-32 I.R.B. 336; I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 2002-34-054 (Aug. 23, 2002). See infra Part IV.C.
83 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(5)(B), (D) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
84 Id. § 856(c)(5)(B)-(C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(c). See also I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-39-017 (Sept. 29, 2000); Rev. Rul. 64-75, 1964-1 C.B. 228.
85 Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(d).  For example, the IRS has ruled that billboards are inherently
permanent structures.  Rev. Rul. 80-151, 1980-1 C.B. 7.
86 Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(d). Cf., Treas. Reg. § 1.856-6(b)(2) (as amended in 2001). See
also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-27-034 (July 7, 2000).
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purposes of the Assets Test.87  Accordingly, hotel furnishings and movable
gaming equipment do not constitute real property assets for purposes of the
Assets Test.88
There is significant complexity within the 75% Income Test and 95%
Income Test.89  Equity or property holding REITs derive nearly all their quali-
fying income from their Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter “IRC”)
§ 856(d)(1)(A)90 rents (hereinafter “real property rents”), deriving substantially
less qualifying income from charges for services that are customarily furnished
(with the rental of real property),91 and amounts received for de minimis per-
sonal property leases.92  However, the definition of real property rents interacts
with a rule that excludes any impermissible tenant services income within IRC
§ 856(d)(2)(C) (hereinafter “impermissible tenant services income”).93  This
limits qualifying real property rents to:
• Gross amounts94 received for the use of, or right to use, the REIT’s real
property95 (hereinafter “real property payments”) where no services are
provided;
87 Even if a structure or component is a fixture for local law purposes, because local law
definitions of real property interests are not controlling.  Instead, federal tax law definitions
control what constitutes a real property asset, for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 856(c) (2006 &
Supp. II 2008).  Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(d); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-04-019 (Jan. 29, 1999).
88 See Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(d). See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-40-028 (Oct. 3, 2008).
Cf., former Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(a) (1962).
89 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(2)-(3) (2006 & Supp. II 2008), respectively.
90 Id. § 856(d)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
91 Id. § 856(d)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(1) (as amended in
1981).
92 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(1)(C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
93 Id. § 856(d)(2)(C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  As defined in 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(7)(A)
(2006 & Supp. II 2008).  The income of a REIT from services (including directly realized
services customarily furnished under 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008)), and
from the operation or management of real property, constitutes impermissible tenant services
income within 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(2)(C), (d)(7)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  Impermissible
tenant services income is included in the REIT’s total gross income for purposes of applying
the 75% Income Test and the 95% Income Test, but is not treated as qualifying income. Id.
§ 856(d)(7)(E) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  However, income from services furnished using
taxable REIT subsidiary arrangements, services furnished using independent contractor
arrangements, and from directly provided customary services that do not give rise to unre-
lated business taxable income are excluded from impermissible tenant services income. Id.
§ 856(d)(2)(C), (d)(7)(A), (d)(7)(C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). See generally I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 94-24-033 (June 17, 1994).  Impermissible tenant services income is determined on a
property-by-property basis (not a lease-by-lease basis).  Rev. Rul. 98-60, 1998-2 C.B. 749;
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-39-017 (Aug. 29, 2000).
94 Income from contractual shares in the income or profits of REIT lessees is non-qualify-
ing, but generally a REIT derives qualifying rent when calculated as a percentage of gross
sales or gross receipts.  26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.856-4(b)(3) (as amended in 1981).
95 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(a).  These rules
link REIT gross income to the use of (and transfer of rights in connection with) the REIT’s
real property (“the term ‘rents from real property’ means, generally, the gross amount
received for the use of, or the right to use, real property of the [REIT]”).  Treas. Reg.
§ 1.856-4(a) (emphasis added).  Fixed easement and license fees have been held to qualify as
real property rents.  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-08-023 (Feb. 26, 1999) (with customary ser-
vices supplied by independent contractors). Cf., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-41-024 (Oct. 13,
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• Gross amounts from real property payments that include a de minimis
lease of personal property (including amounts received for the de
minimis personal property lease);96
• Gross amounts from real property payments where the REIT directly
provides non-customary services to tenants or property users but whose
amount97 remains within a 1% de minimis exception (but all such de
minimis services based income is non-qualifying);98
• Gross amounts from real property payments where the REIT directly
provides customary services which do not fall within the exception per-
mitting those services that would not give rise to unrelated business tax-
able income99 but do not exceed a 1% de minimis limit100 (but all such
de minimis services income is non-qualifying);101
• Gross amounts from real property payments where services are deliv-
ered by a qualifying independent contractor  (and only charges from
customary services are qualifying);102
• Gross amounts received from real property payments where customary
or non-customary services are delivered by a taxable REIT subsidiary103
(not the REIT); and,
• Gross amounts received by the REIT for directly providing customary
services (but only if received in connection with real property payments
2000) (REIT generated qualifying real property rents from rooftop lease and license fees).
See infra note 123.
96 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(1)(A), (C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  Consequently, a REIT cannot
lease more than a de minimis amount of personal property, without tainting some of the
income as non-qualifying.  To qualify for the de minimis exception, the personal property
lease must be made in connection with a lease of the real property, and the personal property
component of lease income cannot exceed 15% of total lease income. Id. § 856(d)(1)(C)
(2006 & Supp. II 2008). Cf., H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 366 (1975).
97 Together with all other amounts of impermissible tenant services income at the property.
See supra note 95.
98 The de minimis exception permits REITs that directly deliver de minimis services to
nonetheless qualify the income derived from a lease of the real property as qualifying rents
for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008), under 26 U.S.C.
§ 856(d)(7)(A)-(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 604 (1997).  The de
minimis rule effectively inoculates qualifying income derived from a property where ser-
vices income (not otherwise excepted from constituting impermissible tenant services
income) is less than 1% of all amounts received or accrued by the REIT at the property.
However, for purposes of calculating the 1% limit, the amount deemed received as imper-
missible tenant services income is not less than 150% of the REIT’s direct cost in furnishing
the service.  26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(7)(D) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-
06-016 (Nov. 3, 2000).
99 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(2)(C), (d)(7)(A)(1), (d)(7)(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). See supra
note 100.
100 See supra note 95.
101 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(1)(A)-(B), (d)(2)(C), (d)(7)(A)-(C)(ii) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
102 Id. § 856(d)(1)(A)-(B), (d)(7)(C)(i) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). Cf., Treas. Reg. § 1.856-
4(a), (b)(1). See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-08-013 (Feb. 26, 1993).
103 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(7)(C)(i) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(a) (predating
statutory changes that permit services delivered by taxable REIT subsidiaries).
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and within an exception permitting services that do not give rise to unre-
lated business taxable income).104
What constitutes a customary service is determined by reference to the
services that are customary in the real property’s geographic area (looking to
similar class properties).105  Typically, when buildings supply customary ser-
vices, they provide heat, light, water, air conditioning, general maintenance and
janitorial services, elevators, recreational facilities, laundry facilities, or secur-
ity services.106  Because destination gaming resorts are located in unique mar-
kets where comparable class gaming properties normally supply extensive
services, it is likely that many services found at destination gaming resorts will
yield significant customary service qualifying income (if delivered using an
independent contractor, and in limited cases, the REIT itself).
Qualifying real property rents are mostly derived from the consideration
received from unrelated parties for the transfer of leaseholds or other rights
respecting the REIT’s real property assets107 (directly, and, as detailed below,
through its subsidiary partnerships), together with the consideration received
for providing a limited type and value of services, in limited ways, to tenants or
users of the REIT’s real property.108  As detailed above, if a REIT directly
supplies customary services, the REIT generates impermissible tenant services
income unless the services would be excluded from unrelated business taxable
income under IRC § 512(b)(3).109  For purposes of the rules, IRC
§ 512(b)(3)110 provides that its definition of rent is excluded unrelated business
104 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(C), (d)(7)(A), (d)(7)(C)(ii) (2006 & Supp. II 2008);
Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(1). See also 26 U.S.C.A. § 512(b) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L.
No. 111-312 effective Dec. 17, 2010); 26 U.S.C. § 511(a)(2) (2006); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
96-40-007 (Oct. 4, 1996).
105 Services rendered to the tenants of a particular building are customary if, in the geo-
graphic market in which the building is located, tenants in buildings of similar class are also
customarily supplied with the service.  Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(1); S. REP. NO. 94-938, at
474 (1976). Cf., H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 601-602 (1997).
106 Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(1).  Furnishing heat and light; utilities; repairs and mainte-
nance; cleaning public entrances, exits, stairwells, and lobbies; certain telecommunication,
cable television and satellite television; parking; marketing and promotion; and the collec-
tion of trash or janitorial services are generally customary services not deemed rendered to a
particular occupant or user. Id.; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-20-023 (May 16, 2003); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-35-013 (Aug. 28, 1998); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-50-009 (Dec. 11, 1998).
107 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(a). See infra
note 97.
108 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(C), (d)(7)(C)(i) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
109 26 U.S.C.A. § 512(b)(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 111-312 effective Dec. 17,
2010).  If it were received by a 26 U.S.C. § 511(a)(2) (2006) organization.  26 U.S.C.
§ 856(d)(7)(C)(ii) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  For instance, leasing facilities without services,
and for a fixed fee, to third party users, generates rent excluded from unrelated business
taxable income.  Rev. Rul. 80-297, 1980-2 C.B. 196.
110 26 U.S.C.A. § 512(b)(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 111-312 effective Dec. 17,
2010).  Because 26 U.S.C. § 856(d) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) and 26 U.S.C.A. § 512(b)(3)
(West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 111-312 effective Dec. 17, 2010) use substantially
similar terms, their definitions of rent are often treated as interchangeable.  However, rent for
purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 856(d) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) is broader than rent for purposes of
26 U.S.C.A. § 512(b)(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 111-312 effective Dec. 17,
2010) because only the former includes customary services amounts. See infra note 126.
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taxable income.111  Here, rent112 includes payments for use or occupancy and
for services that are usually or customarily supplied with use or occupancy.  A
payment is no longer excepted rent if any services supplied are unusual or non-
customary because rent does not include payments for services rendered to an
occupant (or any payment received for the use or occupancy of rooms where
services are also provided to occupants).113  However, services are only
deemed provided to an occupant when they are primarily for the occupant’s
convenience and are not the type of services usually supplied in connection
with the rental of rooms for occupancy only.114  Income from services supplied
in hotels, apartment hotels, or motels is not exempt from unrelated business
taxable income, unless the services are so usual and general that they are not
deemed rendered to any particular occupant.115  Accordingly, directly supply-
ing services like foodservice or housekeeping is so personal and beyond merely
supplying a room that, even if a customary service for purposes of IRC
§ 856(d)(1)(B), it must be supplied by an independent contractor or taxable
REIT subsidiary.116  In contrast, furnishing general services, such as heat and
light, cleaning public entrances, exits, stairwells, and lobbies, and collecting
trash are not services deemed rendered to an occupant.117  Provided customa-
rily, a REIT can directly supply these general services.
A REIT’s proportionate share of the income of a partnership in which it
owns an interest is deemed earned by the REIT; consequently, a partnership’s
earnings that constitute qualifying real property rents will be deemed those of
the REIT, to the extent of its proportionate share.118  Here, partnership-derived
income retains the character it had in partnership solution when deemed real-
ized by the REIT.119  If a partnership derives non-qualifying income (including
impermissible tenant services income), the REIT will be deemed to derive it to
111 26 U.S.C.A. § 512(b)(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 111-312 effective Dec. 17,
2010).
112 Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(c)(5) (1958).
113 Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(c)(5) (as amended in 1992); H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, at 216
(1986) (Conf. Rep.). See infra note 126.
114 Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(c)(5) (as amended in 1992).  What is a usual service is deter-
mined by the underlying property and its geographic location. Cf., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-
14-022 (Jan. 2, 1990).
115 Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(c)(1),(5); 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(7)(C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  A
REIT may generally supply services deemed rendered to a particular occupant through a
taxable REIT subsidiary or independent contractor. Id. § 856(d)(7)(C)(i) (2006 & Supp. II
2008).
116 Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1992); Rev. Rul. 69-69, 1969-1 C.B. 159.
Supplying substantial services to a user “beyond those . . . rendered in connection with the
rental of space for occupancy only[,]” for a particular user’s convenience, in connection with
a real property lease, is not exempt from unrelated business taxable income.  Rev. Rul. 80-
298, 1980-2 C.B. 197; See also Rev. Rul. 76-402, 1976-2 C.B. 177.
117 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.  2003-20-023 (May 16, 2003); Rev. Rul. 69-178, 1969-1 C.B. 158;
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-20-023 (May 16, 2003); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-14-022 (Apr. 6,
1990); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-40-056 (Oct. 8, 1993); H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, at 220-221
(1986) (Conf. Rep.).
118 Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g) (as amended in 1992). See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-13-
019 (Mar. 29, 1996); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-10-014 (Mar. 7, 2003).
119 Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g). See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-13-019 (Mar. 29, 1996);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-34-054 (Aug. 23, 2002); 26 U.S.C. § 704(b)-(c) (2006).
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the extent of its proportionate share (not its share under any allocation provi-
sion of a partnership agreement).120
Despite the historic acceptance of the passive components of hotel
income121 and the persistently broad definition of real property rents (not lim-
ited to leaseholds and without a minimum period of use or possession122), in
one administrative ruling there is a suggestion that amounts received for short-
term occupancy could generate non-qualifying income.  This risk appears to be
greatest when stays are short, users enjoy extensive services, and the fee paid
covers both services and occupancy.123  This suggestion implies that the Inter-
nal Revenue Service may contend that payment for mere occupancy in a desti-
nation gaming resort is non-qualifying income.  However, it is notable that
income is not automatically disqualified as rent (for purposes of IRC
§ 512(b)(3)124) merely because no leasehold exists under local law.125  Under
120 Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g). See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-13-019 (Mar. 29, 1996). See
infra note 213.
121 Historically, the definition of real property rents in Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(a) approved of
amounts paid for accommodation as qualifying rent when it adopted an apportionment
approach [hereinafter “apportionment approach”] to income from hotel or other furnished
accommodation.  As originally promulgated, it provided “. . . the term ‘rents from real prop-
erty’ means, generally, the gross amounts received for the use of or the right to use, real
property of the [REIT].  Where an amount of rent is received with respect to property con-
sisting of both real and other property, such as a furnished apartment building, hotel or
motel, an apportionment of the rent is required.  Only that part of the rent attributable to ‘real
property’ shall be included for purposes of the gross income requirements . . .”  T.D. 6598,
1962-1 C.B. 92, 105 (emphasis added).  Almost twenty years later, during the regulatory
overhaul necessitated by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., Pub. L. No.
94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1742 (1976), and the Act to Amend the Tariff Schedule of the United
States to Permit the Importation of Upholstery Regulators, Upholsterer’s Regulating Needles
and Upholsterer’s Pins Free of Duty [hereinafter “The Upholsterer Act”], H.R. 421, 93d
Cong., Pub. L. No. 93-625, 88 Stat. 2108, 2112 (1974), the apportionment approach was
excised from Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(a).  T.D. 7767, 1981-1 C.B. 82, 92.
122 See supra note 96. But see 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (referring
to “rents from interests in real property”) (emphasis added).  Neither 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)
(2006 & Supp. II 2008) or Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(a) currently treat income from payments
for use or the right to use hotel or furnished apartments as non-qualifying.  As a practical
matter, the issue is practically moot because the excess of personal services at hotels gener-
ally will cause them to fail the passive income tests even if fees for occupancy and custom-
ary services are qualifying.
123 SCOTT L. SEMER & MICHELE J. ALEXANDER, STRUCTURING REAL ESTATE JOINT VEN-
TURES WITH PRIVATE REITS A-11, A-15 (BNA Tax Management Portfolio 743) (2009)
[hereinafter SEMER & ALEXANDER]; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-40-028 (June 17, 2008) (“. . .
whether an arrangement is a lease that produces rents from real property for purposes of
section 856(d) or a license or other contract right associated with lodging is determined by
examining the substance of the arrangement in its entirety . . .”).  The ruling does not specify
the source for limiting recognition of lodging rents and does not specify a duration or level
of services after which income becomes non-qualifying; instead, the ruling relies on a gen-
eral proposition (form does not control income tax consequences).  Other decisions are con-
sistent with past recognition of hotel and furnished short term accommodation as containing
qualifying income.  In Rev. Rul. 98-60, 1998-2 C.B. 749, a REIT whose business included a
nominal 5% amount of short-term furnished rental apartments (supplied to transient guests
under a lease with personal services including housekeeping), the ruling relied on the imper-
missible tenant services income rules. See infra note 158.
124 26 U.S.C.A. § 512(b)(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 111-312 effective Dec. 17,
2010); SEMER & ALEXANDER, supra note 123 at A-15 n.119 (concluding that rent for pur-
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this line of reasoning, a REIT risks developing non-qualifying income if it also
realizes income from directly supplying substantial personal services to occu-
pants when they, in substance, are paying for purely personal services.126  Con-
sequently, it does not appear that an arrangement is automatically tainted by
substantial personal services if the income associated with it is not realized by
the REIT or, while realized by the REIT, represents only a nominal amount.
While treating the components of hospitality income that are in substance
amounts received for use or occupancy of real property as non-qualifying is
arguably unsupported by legislative history127 and in defiance of the broad def-
poses of 26 U.S.C. § 856(d) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) has at least as broad a meaning as rent
for purposes of 26 U.S.C.A. § 512(b) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 111-312 effective
Dec. 17, 2010)).
125 SEMER & ALEXANDER, supra note 123, at A-15; I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,034 (Feb.
3, 1969) (“. . . [e]ven if it were to be assumed, however, that no leasehold interests would be
created by the arrangements described . . . we do not believe that this circumstance would
necessarily preclude the payments from being treated as rents . . . we think that it can prop-
erly be inferred that all income items that are received as consideration for granting another
party a temporary right to occupy real property will come within the term rents as used in
section 512(b)(3) if they also fairly represent what section 543(b)(3) refers to as compensa-
tion, however designated, for the use of that property as such, and by the same token do not
reflect the rendition of any significant services that are primarily for the convenience of the
temporary occupant . . .”) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted); Rev. Rul. 69-178,
1969-1 C.B. 158 (“[s]ince the charges in this case are made for the use and occupancy of
space in real property and only utilities and janitorial services are provided, the receipts
constitute rental income.  The fact that the use is only for short periods of time does not
destroy the character of the receipts . . .”).
126 This appears consistent with 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(7)(C)(ii) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) and in
accord with the legislative intent behind An Act to Amend the Internal Revenue Code With
Respect to Excise Taxes on Cigars, H.R. 10960, 86th Cong., Pub. L. No. 86-779, 74 Stat.
998, 1003-04 (1960) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (“ . . . one of
the principal purposes of your committee in imposing restrictions on the types of income of a
qualifying [REIT] is to be sure that the bulk of its income is from passive income sources . . .
[t]his interest in restricting the income of the trust to that of a passive nature also accounts
for two of the restrictions provided in the definition of [rents] . . .”)(emphasis added). H.R.
REP. NO. 86-2020, at 15 (1960).  Implicit in both I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,034 (Feb. 3,
1969) and Rev. Rul. 69-178, 1969-1 C.B. 158 was the fact that, before rental income would
be regarded as non-qualifying, it must reflect amounts from supplying significant personal
services for particular occupants. See infra notes 158 and 169.
127 Nothing in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., Pub. L. No. 94-455,
90 Stat. 1520, 1742 (1976) or the Upholsterer Act, H.R. 421, 93d Cong., Pub. L. No. 93-625,
88 Stat. 2108, 2112 (1974) required or directed the Treasury Department to exclude all hotel
income from the definition of qualifying rent.  Instead, the Tax Reform Act of 1976, H.R.
10612, derogated the apportionment approach that excluded all amounts received for per-
sonal property when it expanded qualifying income to include de minimis personal property.
H.R. 10612, § 1604(b), codified at 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(1)(C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). H.R.
REP. NO. 94-658, at 366 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 474 (1976) (each using furnished
apartment buildings as examples). Cf., Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(2) (1981).  Moreover, the
amendment of Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(a) did not claim to derogate the historic treatment of
the real property components of hotel or furnished apartment income generally.  T.D. 7767,
1981-1 C.B. 82.  It would have been easy when revising Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(a) to merely
replace the reference to apportionment with a new de minimis personal property rule, leaving
intact the regulation’s description of qualifying hotel income.  Considering the Congress’
apparent satisfaction with the existing approach treating the passive components of hotel
income as qualifying, it appears that the drafters may have stripped the entire apportionment
approach to avoid confusion with the Upholsterer Act’s new foreclosure rules.  T.D. 7767,
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inition of qualifying rents, assuming that hotel rents are rendered non-qualify-
ing in the presence of extensive personal services income, the destination
gaming resort may consider a division into separate active and passive busi-
ness-tiered partnerships.128  Under the special rules applicable to tiered partner-
ships, such a division limits the REIT engaging in direct operation to income
from short-term use or occupancy and fees from any directly realizable or inde-
pendent contractor supplied customary services, notwithstanding that guests
enjoy extensive services over short stays.  In effect, this division purges from
the REIT’s income the personal service-intensive components of short-stay
lodging income that might make it susceptible to deriving, in substance, only
personal service income. Importantly, such an arrangement accords with those
authorities that treat amounts realized by the REIT for mere occupancy as qual-
ifying income.129
To comply with the limits on qualifying income, but also arrange for prop-
erty users’ access to services that would yield impermissible tenant services
income when delivered directly, REITs can use independent contractors.130
Independent contractors must be distinguished from independent third-party
suppliers (hereinafter “independent third party suppliers”) who supply services
under direct agreements with tenants (without remitting any proceeds to the
REIT).131  To qualify, an independent contractor may not be an employee or
agent of the REIT or otherwise be subject to its control.132  A REIT cannot
derive income from its independent contractor.133  When the service delivered
1981-1 C.B. 82. Cf., S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 31 (1974). Cf., Treas. Reg. § 1.856-6(b)(2)
(1981); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-6(d)(2) (1981).  It therefore appears that removing the appor-
tionment approach was the result of limited statutory derogation that expanded the definition
of qualifying income but did not interfere with existing recognition that hotel rents can con-
stitute qualifying income, while the broader than strictly necessary revisions to the regulation
apparently reflected an effort to avoid confusion with several new hotel-specific foreclosure
rules.
128 See infra Part IV.C-D. Cf., Rev. Rul. 74-353, 1974-2 C.B. 200 (unrelated co-owner of a
REIT realizing services income did not taint the REIT’s qualifying income since the REIT
derived no direct or indirect income or benefit therefrom).
129 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(a) (as amended in
1981); 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(7) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Rev. Rul. 98-60, 1998-2 C.B. 749.
The arrangement aims to limit the REIT to income that would not constitute unrelated busi-
ness taxable income, since it derives substantially all its income from the property as fees for
mere occupancy and from customary services (not for the benefit of particular occupants).
130 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(7)(C)(i) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(5) (as
amended in 1981); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-24-033 (June 17, 1994). Cf. 26 U.S.C.
§ 856(d)(2)(C), (d)(7)(C)(i) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). See supra note 117.
131 Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(5)(i) (1962). See also Rev. Rul. 76-534, 1976-1 C.B. 215;
Rev. Rul. 77-23, 1977-1 C.B. 197.  Independent third party suppliers are described in I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-13-021 (Dec. 15, 1999).
132 Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(5)(i) (as amended in 1981). See also Rev. Rul. 76-534, 1976-2
C.B. 215; Rev. Rul. 77-23, 1977-1 C.B. 197.
133 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(3),(d)(7)(C)(i) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-
4(b)(5)(i) (as amended in 1981). See also Rev. Rul. 66-189, 1966-2 C.B. 277.  This is inter-
preted as barring the REIT from deriving income from the independent contractor other than
where the independent contractor acts as a mere conduit for services the REIT can directly
provide.  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-46-019 (Nov. 13, 1998).  The adequate compensation
requirement aims to prevent REITs from inflating their net rental income.  Rev. Rul. 75-52,
1975-1 C.B. 198.
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is customary, the REIT can bear the cost of the service even though the service
is furnished or rendered by the independent contractor (using independent con-
tractor facilities).134  When the service delivered is non-customary, the inde-
pendent contractor must bear the complete cost of providing the service, the
charge for the service must be separated from rent, received and retained by the
independent contractor, and the independent contractor must be adequately
compensated.135
Independent contractor is defined at IRC § 856(d)(3).136  Under these
rules, what constitutes an independent contractor is generally the common law
definition (requiring an absence of control by the REIT137), supplemented by
bright line rules138 that consider equity ownership.  These rules deem an inde-
pendent contractor to be (i) any person who does not own more than 35% of the
shares of the REIT (directly and by attribution of shares);139 (ii) a corporation
in which no more than 35% of the total combined voting power of its stock is
owned (directly and by attribution of shares) by one or more persons who own
35% or more of the REIT;140 or  (iii) a partnership, limited liability company,
or other non-corporate entity in which no more than 35% of the interest in its
assets or net profits is owned—directly and by attribution of interests—by per-
sons who own 35% or more of the REIT (directly and by attribution of
shares).141  Before the advent of taxable REIT subsidiaries and the rules per-
mitting REITs to directly realize limited customary services income, these
restrictions forced REITs to contract with independent firms to manage and
operate REIT properties142 and to deliver services.143
After several reforms, it became possible for a REIT to own and control
taxable REIT subsidiaries that delivered customary or non-customary personal
or general services,144 without impairing the REIT’s qualifying income.145
Because they permit REITs to realize in after-tax form the income available
134 Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(5)(i).  These rules preclude REITs from realizing amounts paid
for non-customary services but permit them to collect amounts for customary services, pay-
ing themselves the independent contractor.
135 Id.  If the REIT supplied more than de minimis non-customary services using a defective
independent contractor arrangement, then all the income from the property is deemed non-
qualifying. Id.
136 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(3) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). Cf., H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 602
(1997).
137 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(3) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
138 Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(5)(iii).
139 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(3)(A), (d)(5) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-
4(b)(5)(iii)(a), (b)(7).
140 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(3)(B), (d)(5) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-
4(b)(5)(iii)(b)(1), (b)(7).
141 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(3)(B), (d)(5) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-
4(b)(5)(iii)(b)(2), (b)(7).
142 Cf., Rev. Rul. 77-23, 1977-1 C.B. 197; Rev. Rul. 76-534, 1976-2 C.B. 215.
143 The independent contractor rules allow a real property based business to exit its passive
real property investment through a public listing transaction involving a REIT election, but
permits firm insiders to retain the management business, provided they do not exceed the
disqualification threshold.  26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(3), (d)(5) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas.
Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(5)(iii).
144 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(8) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Ticket to Work and Work Incentives
Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 1180, 106th Cong., Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 542-543, 113
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-1\NVG103.txt unknown Seq: 21 13-JUN-11 8:40
Spring 2011] REIT INVESTMENT 67
from supplying personal or non-customary services, taxable REIT subsidiaries
became the arrangement through which REITs expanded the scope of their bus-
iness activities and profits, without tainting their qualifying income.146  Taxa-
ble REIT subsidiaries are corporations that are owned, directly or indirectly, by
a REIT.  They are subject to a corporate level tax and, unlike their REIT parent,
do not benefit from the dividends paid deduction.147  It is important to distin-
guish taxable REIT subsidiary distributions from the deductible payments they
make to the REIT (such as rent); the former are after tax payments, while the
latter are effectively pre-tax and generally qualify for the 75% Income Test and
95% Income Test.  They are not directly required to make distributions to their
REIT parent, but their business relationship must be arm’s length.  Here, to
prevent a REIT from inflating rent or other amounts charged through its taxable
REIT subsidiary, effectively extending its tax efficiency to non-qualifying
income, a REIT is subject to a confiscatory excise tax on excessive rents it
derives from tenants also receiving services from taxable REIT subsidiaries,
misallocated deductions in connection with its taxable REIT subsidiaries, and
excess interest amounts charged to its taxable REIT subsidiaries.148
A subsidiary qualifies as a taxable REIT subsidiary when it is entirely or
partially owned by the REIT and both the REIT and the subsidiary make an
election.149  Where a taxable REIT subsidiary itself has subsidiaries, these
lower-tier subsidiaries are automatically treated as taxable REIT subsidiaries if
the upper-tier taxable REIT subsidiary owns stock or securities amounting to
35% or more of the lower-tier subsidiary’s value or vote.150  However, the
REIT qualification rules limit the value of all taxable REIT subsidiaries, rela-
tive to total REIT asset value, to no more than 25%.151  The total value of all
the taxable REIT subsidiary securities owned by the REIT (together with the
value of all the REIT’s non-real property assets) cannot exceed 25% of the
value of all REIT assets.152  A REIT’s securities owned in a taxable REIT
subsidiary are not real property assets for purposes of the Assets Test.153  Sig-
nificantly, a taxable REIT subsidiary’s distributions to its REIT parent consti-
tute qualifying passive income for purposes of the 95% Income Test, but not
Stat. 1860, 1941-44 (1999); S. REP. NO. 106-201, at 59 (1999); Rev. Rul. 2002-38, 2002-2
C.B. 4. See generally I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-34-054 (Aug. 23, 2002).
145 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(C), (d)(7)(A), (d)(8) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). See also
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-34-054 (Aug. 23, 2002).
146 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(7)(C)(i) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  A REIT is treated as not rendering
or providing any services that its taxable REIT subsidiary does. Id.  The rules permit REITs
to use a taxable REIT subsidiary to deliver services to non-lessee third parties. Cf., S. REP.
NO. 106-201, at 57 (1999).
147 26 U.S.C. §§ 857(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008), 11(a), (c)(3) (2006).
148 Id. § 857(b)(7)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
149 Id. § 856(l)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
150 Id. § 856(l)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). Cf., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-34-054 (Aug. 23,
2002).
151 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(4)(B)(ii) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  Prior to tax year 2009, the limit
was 20%, but it was modified to 25% under § 3041 of the Federal Housing Finance Regula-
tory Reform Act of 2008, H.R. 6521, 110th Cong., Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654,
2900 (2008).
152 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(4)(B)(i) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
153 Id. § 856(c)(4)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
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the 75% Income Test.154  These limitations combine to preclude REITs from
conducting substantial active businesses through their taxable REIT subsidiar-
ies (or realizing or retaining substantial earnings in taxable REIT subsidiary
solution).
A taxable REIT subsidiary can engage in nearly any type of business,
including active businesses providing personal services to REIT lessees or third
parties that would be problematic if the REIT delivered the service directly.155
However, enterprises in two specific lines of business cannot qualify as taxable
REIT subsidiaries, irrespective of the amount or value of the business.  A taxa-
ble REIT subsidiary cannot itself operate or manage hotels and cannot
franchise or license a service or trademark under which lodging is provided.156
This special rule applies where the property is a lodging facility (such as a hotel
or resort).157  However, a REIT may lease its hotel property to its taxable REIT
subsidiary, and the payments under the lease will constitute qualifying rents
(without regard to the restrictions on rental arrangements with related parties
154 Compare id. § 856(c)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) with id. § 856(c)(3) (2006 & Supp.
II 2008).  Distributions from a taxable REIT subsidiary must not cause the REIT to lack
sufficient passive real estate income for the 75% Income Test.  In effect, active business
realized in taxable REIT subsidiary solution is converted into qualifying passive income
(dividends), for purposes of the 95% Income Test, but remains non-qualifying for the 75%
Income Test.
155 A taxable REIT subsidiary may engage in any business activity (excepting only operat-
ing, licensing, or managing lodging or health-care facilities) even if the activity is one that,
directly conducted by the REIT, would disqualify its income; accordingly, a taxable REIT
subsidiary may supply services to the REIT tenants, even where services are non-customary.
Id. § 856(d)(7)(C)(i), (d)(8), (d)(9) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); S. REP. NO. 106-201, at 59
(1999). See also Rev. Rul. 2003-86, 2003-2 C.B. 290.
156 26 U.S.C. § 856(l)(3) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  A taxable REIT subsidiary may invest in
corporations that operate, manage or own a lodging facility (or issue franchises or license a
brand name for lodging facilities), provided the taxable REIT subsidiary does not own more
than 35% of the lodging corporation’s securities.  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-15-026 (Apr.
11, 2008).  A master lease of a pipeline system, including personal property, to an unrelated
operator gave rise to rent from real property for purposes of 26 U.S.C.A. § 512(b)(3) (West,
Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 111-312 effective Dec. 17, 2010).  Tax Reform Act of 1976,
H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1742 (1976); Rev. Rul. 67-218,
1967-2 C.B. 213.  Furnishing only facilities under lease to an unrelated lessee who operates
real property generates qualifying rent, for purposes of 26 U.S.C.A. § 512(b) (West,
Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 111-312 effective Dec. 17, 2010).  Tax Reform Act of 1976,
H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1742 (1976); Rev. Rul. 80-297,
1980-2 C.B. 196.  Accordingly, a REIT can lease a lodging property to a sufficiently unre-
lated hotel operator using a master lease.  There is a significant basis to conclude that a REIT
can directly realize qualifying income from guest payments for mere use and occupancy and
customary services (provided it does not develop more than de minimis impermissible tenant
services income).  In Rev. Rul. 98-60, 1998-2 C.B. 749, provided the impermissible tenant
services income from short term furnished apartment rentals (inclusive of housekeeping) did
not exceed 1% of all amounts, the fees for occupancy remained qualifying rents. Cf., I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-36-025 (June 8, 1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-28-033 (Apr. 20, 1994);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-51-036 (Dec. 19, 1997) (REIT developed qualifying income in the
form of license fees, using an independent contractor). But see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-
40-028 (Oct. 3, 2008). See supra notes 95, 97, 123 and 129.
157 As defined in 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(9)(D)(ii) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
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discussed infra) if the arrangement constitutes a qualified lodging facility.158
A qualified lodging facility is a lease of a lodging facility without any wagering
activity, where the property is operated by an independent contractor159 (who
actively operates lodging facilities for unrelated third parties)160 and whose rent
is set at fair market value level (not tied to net profits).161  For these purposes, a
lodging facility includes hotels, motels, or other properties where more than
half of the dwelling units are occupied on a transient basis.162  The extent of the
lodging facility is determined by reference to the amenities and facilities that
are customary to facilities of a comparable size and class.163  However, a quali-
fied lodging facility arrangement is ineffective if (i) the value of the taxable
REIT subsidiary’s securities would exceed 25% of the REIT’s aggregate asset
value, (ii) the distributions (other than qualifying rent) would cause the REIT to
fail the 75% Income Test,164 or (iii) there will exist gaming or wagering activi-
ties at the property.
A destination gaming resort cannot be leased or contributed by a REIT to
a taxable REIT subsidiary, even where the property will be operated by an
independent contractor, because the gaming present precludes ever being a
qualified lodging facility.  Because a gaming resort property could not be iso-
lated in a taxable REIT subsidiary, the REIT could only own the property if all
the active income it derived therefrom, together with all its other active REIT
income, constituted less than 5% of its gross annual income, and the active
income derived from services did not trigger the disqualification of all the prop-
erty’s income as impermissible tenant services income (by remaining de
158 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(8)(B), (d)(9)(D) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); S. REP. NO. 106-201, at 59
(1999); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-25-034 (June 30, 2008).  Taxable REIT subsidiaries that
lease qualified lodging facilities can bear all the expenses of operating the facility and
receive all net revenues, less the independent contractor’s fees.  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-
13-003 (Mar. 28, 2008).  A REIT can arrange its relationship with the independent contrac-
tor so that it ultimately derives substantially all the net economic return (excepting manage-
ment fees).
159 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(8)(B), (d)(9)(A)-(B), (d)(9)(D), (l)(3) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
160 Id. § 856(d)(9)(A), (d)(9)(F) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  Persons outside the ambit of 26
U.S.C. § 52(a)-(b) (2006).  Active operation of lodging facilities can be determined by refer-
ence to the standards for assessing active conduct of a trade or business set out in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.355-3(b)(2)(iii).  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-25-034 (June 20, 2008).
161 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(9)(D)(i) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); S. REP. NO. 106-201, at 59 (1999);
H.R. REP. NO. 106-478, at 177-178 (1999) (Conf. Rep.).  Under the rules in 26 U.S.C.
§ 856(d)(9)(A)-(B), (d)(9)(D), (l)(3) (2006 & Supp. II 2008), a subsidiary is not eligible to
be a taxable REIT subsidiary if it, itself, operates or manages a lodging facility.  Instead, it
must resort to an independent contractor.
162 Id. § 856(d)(9)(D)(ii) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). Cf., Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(h)(2)(ii) (as
amended in 1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-40-028 (Oct. 3, 2008); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2003-20-018 (May 16, 2003).
163 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(9)(D)(iii) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (“[t]he term ‘lodging facility’
includes customary amenities and facilities operated as a part of, or associated with, the
lodging facility so long as such amenities and facilities are customary for other properties of
a comparable size and class owned by other [unrelated] owners . . .”).  Because destination
gaming resorts customarily include hotels attached to retail, gaming, restaurant, and
entertainment areas, the lodging facility would extend to nearly all of the property, making
attempts to sever and isolate gaming areas ineffective.
164 Because the fair market value rent of the lodging facility reflects all the active and
passive income available at the property, this event appears unlikely.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-1\NVG103.txt unknown Seq: 24 13-JUN-11 8:40
70 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:47
minimis).165  These rules impose an economic penalty in the form of foregoing
substantially all active income at the destination gaming resort, even in after-
tax form, or foregoing all active and passive income at the property.166  This
limitation appears to be the reason for the absence of REIT involvement in
destination gaming resorts.167
Real property rents do not include any income the REIT derives from les-
sees that are related corporations, partnerships or limited liability companies (or
any other related business arrangement), in which the REIT owns 10% or more
of the stock, assets, or profits.168  For related corporate lessees, the applicable
threshold is the ownership of 10% or more of all the voting stock issued, or
10% or more of the value of all its shares issued.169  For partnership lessees and
limited liability company lessees (or other business arrangements acting as les-
sees), the applicable threshold becomes ownership of 10% or more in the
entity’s assets or profits.170  Here, the REIT’s ownership interest in a related
lessee is determined by reference to IRC § 318 attribution rules.171  Attribution
rules treat stock constructively owned as if actually owned.172  A modification
to the rules for attribution between corporations and shareholders applies which
substitutes a lower 10% threshold into the rules of IRC § 318(a)(2)(C) and IRC
§ 318(a)(3)(C).173  Furthermore, where the REIT owns an interest in a lessee
that is a partnership, the special rule of IRC § 318(a)(3)(A) applies (but modi-
fied to require only a 25% or more interest in the partnership’s capital or profits
before the partnership’s leasing activity becomes attributed to the particular
partner).174  A special exception to these rules applies for rents received
through qualifying taxable REIT subsidiaries.175
Because income attributable to managing or operating real property can
constitute impermissible tenant services income, all income from a specific
property could become non-qualifying income if a REIT manages or oper-
ates,176 beyond merely exercising a fiduciary duty to manage the REIT
itself.177  Like the rules constraining personal services, this limit is potentially
165 See supra note 100. Cf., H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 604 (1997).
166 See Part IV.B.i. See supra note 158.
167 These limitations do not preclude a REIT from owning and operating (through an inde-
pendent contractor) real property where its revenues and assets are limited to passive
income, such as the fees for mere occupancy and customary services delivered by an inde-
pendent contractor or not in respect of particular occupants at a hotel.  26 U.S.C.
§ 856(d)(2)(C), (d)(7)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). Cf., H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 604
(1997). See supra notes 123 and 129.  So limited, the REIT would not need to structure its
ownership of the lodging property so that it constituted a qualified lodging facility for pur-
poses of 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(9)(D)(i) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). See supra note 158.
168 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(2)(B), (d)(5) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-542,
1970-2 C.B. 148.
169 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(2)(B)(i) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
170 Id. § 856(d)(2)(B)(ii) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
171 Id. §§ 318 (2006), 856(d)(5) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
172 See generally id. §§ 267(c)(5), 318(a)(5)(A), 707(b)(3) (2006).
173 Id. §§ 318(a)(2)(C), (a)(3)(C) (2006), 856(d)(5)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
174 Id. §§ 318(a)(3)(A) (2006), 856(d)(5)(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
175 Id. § 856(d)(2)(B), (d)(8) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
176 Id. § 856(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
177 Id. § 856(c)(2)-(3), (d)(7)(A), (d)(7)(C) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-
4(b)(5)(ii) (as amended in 1981).  Examples include: establishing rental rates and terms,
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devastating to an entity’s qualification to make a REIT election, because all
income originating from a particular real property becomes non-qualifying
income, once the amount attributable (together with all other impermissible
tenant services income at the property) exceeds a 1% de minimis limit.178  A
REIT may therefore delegate impermissible management or operational activity
to qualifying independent contractors.179  Alternatively, a REIT can usually
isolate management or operational activities within its taxable REIT
subsidiaries.180
B. Difficulties in Splitting a Destination Gaming Resort Under
Conventional REIT Structuring Arrangements
In theory, a non-gaming business that combines readily separable active
and passive real property can be split, dividing the passive and active compo-
nents of its real property and positioning it to monetize its investment in pas-
sive real property.  Once severed, the passive real property can be transferred to
a REIT, allowing the REIT, through direct operation, to access the active and
passive business available at the passive real property (with active business
realized in after-tax form).  Alternatively, a REIT can acquire the property and
use an operator lease with an unrelated operator (or the seller), deriving only
passive business.  As detailed above, direct operation for most passive real
property is feasible unless the value of all the active business placed in taxable
REIT subsidiary solution will be larger than 25% of its assets, or its distribu-
tions will cause the REIT to fail the 75% Income Test.  If the active business
exceeds these limits, direct operation is unavailable.181  Accordingly, only in
limited cases is the remaining active business so large that the REIT qualifica-
selecting tenants, entering into leases, renewing leases, and dealing with REIT tax, insur-
ance, and interest (when they arose in connection with the REIT’s real property).
178 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(7)(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  A REIT may also directly operate or
manage its properties, as customary, but only to the extent that specific tax-exempt entities
could without triggering unrelated business income tax. Id. § 856(d)(7)(A), (d)(7)(C)(ii)
(2006 & Supp. II 2008). See supra note 95.
179 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(7)(C)(i) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
180 Id.  However, the rules preclude a REIT from using a taxable REIT subsidiary from
managing or operating a lodging facility, whether or not gaming exists at the property. Id.
§ 856(d)(9)(A), (d)(9)(D) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
181 A REIT’s isolating active business within a wholly owned corporate subsidiary capable
of delivering personal services (such as a taxable REIT subsidiary) is not feasible when the
stock owned could present such relative value and voting power that it violates the securities
tests of 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(4)(B)(ii) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) and/or its corporate distribu-
tions cause the REIT to fail the 75% Income Test.  Technically, the amount forgone is equal
to those components of the active business that cause the taxable REIT subsidiary to exceed
the 25% limitation, after reduction for any unused part of the REIT’s directly realizable 1%
de minimis non-qualifying income, at the property as calculated under 26 U.S.C.
§ 856(d)(7)(D) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (subject to the overarching limit of the 5% of REIT
gross income that is unrestricted by the 95% Income Test) or which would cause the taxable
REIT subsidiary’s distributions to produce more than 25% of REIT gross income from non-
qualifying sources under the 75% Income Test.  Faced with this problem, a REIT may use
sufficiently unrelated lessees or independent contractors or independent third party suppliers
to separately arrange services constituting the excess active business.  It may also divest
itself of active business whose value exceeds the amount that can be isolated in a subsidiary,
or lease the entire property to a sufficiently unrelated operator.
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tion rules frustrate direct operation.  However, if the active and passive real
property based businesses are dependent and intertwined, any severing neces-
sary to direct operation is inadvisable if one or both aspects of the business risk
being significantly compromised and the risk cannot otherwise be addressed.
1. Economic Penalties Attaching to Direct Operation of Destination
Gaming Resorts
The restrictions on REITs prove substantially more limiting if the severed
passive real property is part of a destination gaming resort.  Here, even if the
active business aspects of the severed passive real property were not substantial
and valuable enough to thwart direct operation,182 the lodging and gaming
aspects effectively preclude it.  Unable to use a taxable REIT subsidiary, a
REIT engaging in direct operation cannot realize the active business availa-
ble.183  Here, it would be forced to forgo realizing upon all but a de minimis
amount of the active business income available, limiting its income at the prop-
erty to passive business (including customary services that would not yield
impermissible tenant services income).184  In effect, this forces the REIT to
choose between allowing an independent third-party supplier and/or a substan-
tially unrelated independent contractor to realize the active business availa-
ble185 or abandoning direct operation for an operator lease (with a substantially
unrelated lessee186 who derives all the active and passive business availa-
ble).187  For these reasons, a split-up transaction involving gaming hospitality
182 See infra note 203.
183 That is, excepting only active business that will be 1% or less of the property’s gross
income, and fall within the overall 5% of REIT gross income that is unconstrained, so as not
to cause the REIT to fail the 95% Income Test or develop non-de minimis impermissible
tenant services income. See supra note 123.
184 Here, the REIT would derive income from the supply of rooms for mere occupancy, de
minimis chattel rentals and general customary services, falling within the exception to imper-
missible tenant services income set out in 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(7)(C)(ii) (2006 & Supp. II
2008).  The balance of the fees for hotel guests comprises the active business available at the
resort’s passive real property, such as fees for personal services and non-de minimis chattel
rentals.  Operation of the facility (including guest registration and billing) would be per-
formed by independent contractors, using a hotel brand name, with qualifying income remit-
ted to the REIT after collection, and deduction of management fees. See supra notes 94, 99,
122, 157, and 168. But cf. Treas Reg. § 1.761-2(a) (1972).
185 Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(5)(i) (as amended in 1981).  The independent contractor cannot
own more than a 35% interest in the REIT (directly or by attribution), and the REIT share-
holders cannot own a more than 35% interest in the independent contractor (directly or by
attribution).  26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(3) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
186 For this arrangement to permit the REIT to derive qualifying rents, it is important that
the REIT does not own the lessee (directly or by attribution) in an amount equal to or greater
than 10%. Similarly, where the master lessee is a REIT shareholder, its leasing activity can
render the REIT’s income from the property non-qualifying under the restrictions on rental
arrangements with related parties. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. See also
supra note 183.  The lease cannot be perpetual, as this is equivalent to a sale.  I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 90-26-033 (June 29, 1990).  In this way, the REIT only leases or licenses real
property, while a sufficiently unrelated master lessee supplies personal and general services,
in the same general structure reviewed in Rev. Rul. 80-297, 1980-2 C.B. 196. See supra
note 158 and accompanying text.
187 Or by resorting to sufficiently unrelated lessees. See supra note 183 and accompanying
text.  The lease could be based on a gross profit percentage. See supra note 96.
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property188 carries inherent economic disadvantages if a REIT is the
acquirer.189
If a REIT opts for an operator lease, it confronts a business problem. The
gaming and active services components depend, in substantial part, on a guest’s
hospitality experience and the property’s upscale design and reputation.  Simi-
larly, the passive real property (hospitality) business depends, in substantial
part, on the luxury gaming and personal services experience of guests.  Because
the passive real property transferred is essential to the success of the destination
gaming resort’s active real property in these ways, it is unlikely that it would
fully monetize and completely exit its underlying real property investment
through a transaction with a REIT.  It is likely it would only exit its passive real
property if it had sufficient certainty that its operator would not conflict with, or
undermine, its active business.  Because the only reliable assurance available is
to remain in possession under a master lease, the transaction would be an oper-
ator lease under which the destination gaming resort continued to control the
passive real property transferred as lessee; that is, a sale leaseback.
2. Potential Inadequacy of Sale Leaseback Solutions
Sale-leaseback buyers are generally in the business of acquiring properties
from their occupier-owners, then leasing them back to the seller under a triple
net lease.190  As seller, the destination gaming resort generates capital from the
sale and typically frees its balance sheet of debt encumbering the sold real
property, thereby effectively monetizing any tied-up capital.  This arrangement
does not, directly, produce any increase in tax efficiency (although it might
permit a destination gaming resort to avoid public listing).  As rent accrues
under the operator lease, the destination gaming resort is obliged to pay but
remains in possession, and therefore in control, of the entire real property.
Even so, a destination gaming resort likely needs a long-term arrangement not
to impair its underlying active and passive businesses.191  Additionally, a REIT
may be reluctant, as it will gauge the potential effect on its income of a default
under the lease where it re-enters possession.  A substantial detriment to a sale-
leaseback is the fact that the sale transaction is one in which any taxable gain
will be immediately recognized by the selling destination gaming resort.192
3. Inadequacy of Transfer for REIT Equity Solutions
Instead of a sale-leaseback for cash, a destination gaming resort may con-
sider transferring its passive real property for REIT equity, configuring it to
188 Or where the active business available at the severed passive real property is so signifi-
cant that it exceeds 1% of all property income (the amount that could be realized directly by
the REIT). See supra note 185.
189 This would be expressed as a lower value for the passive real property from the perspec-
tive of the REIT but the disadvantage may be sufficiently countered by the REIT’s tax
efficiency.  If a master lease arrangement was used, the fair market value rent would reflect
the income available to the lessee from both active and passive business.  Here, the REIT
indirectly accesses a portion of the active and passive business available.
190 That is, a lease providing payments to the landlord net of insurance, maintenance, real
property taxes and utilities.
191 See supra text accompanying note 188.
192 26 U.S.C. §§ 11(a), 61(a)(3), 311(b), 1001(c) (2006).
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access REIT tax efficiency as to the passive business realizable (and ultimately,
when it exits, to monetize its investment in passive real property).193  Here, it is
important to recall that its restructuring with a REIT has the dual and compet-
ing aims of monetizing its investment in its capital-intensive passive real prop-
erty, and, pending monetization, to improve its tax efficiency—insofar as its
passive real property based income—or all its business income when the trans-
action permits the active gaming business to avoid Subchapter “C” taxation.  A
transfer for equity configures it to achieve both purposes, albeit succes-
sively.194  However, even if the transfer of real property is to a REIT that the
destination gaming resort effectively controls,195 if the real property has signifi-
cant appreciation (hereinafter “built in gain”), the tax triggered is often prohibi-
tive.  Significantly, where the consideration received is a substantial equity
interest in the purchaser in relatively liquid form, like publicly traded REIT
stock, the business retains an indirect and potentially controlling interest in the
passive real property’s future economic returns but the exchange is commonly
taxable.196  It is unlikely, however, given these dependent and intertwined
active and passive business components that it would seek to fully monetize
and completely exit its passive real property investment through a transaction
with a REIT (even if it received substantial or controlling REIT equity or con-
tinued in possession as lessee under an operator lease).  First, the potential for
conflicts of interest between it and the REIT remain, with potential fiduciary
duties fettering any actual exercise of control.  Second, if the destination gam-
ing resort obtains more than a nominal equity interest in the REIT, its lease
arrangement would be subject to the restrictions on rental arrangements with
related parties.197  This would tend to preclude the destination gaming resort
from acting as master lessee, leading to the introduction of an unrelated third-
193 However, an improvement in tax efficiency may require additional steps. See infra Part
IV.E.
194 See infra Part IV.E.
195 A transfer is to a controlled REIT when the transferor has, or will thereby acquire,
control for purposes of 26 U.S.C. §§ 351(a), 368(c) (2006).  Normally, a contribution of real
property to a publicly traded REIT in exchange for stock fails the non-recognition require-
ments of 26 U.S.C. § 351(a) (2006), due to the contributor’s lack of 80% control over the
REIT. Cf., Id. § 368(c) (2006).  Nevertheless, the contribution is also a taxable event if it is
to a REIT that is an investment company, a result that depends on diversifying the contribu-
tor interests. Id. § 351(e) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c) (as amended in 1996). See also
Rev. Rul. 87-9, 1987-1 C.B. 133.  An analogous provision to 26 U.S.C. § 351(e) (2006)
exists for partnership contributions to an investment partnership, but these transactions gen-
erally will not activate them, as the partnerships do not hold stock, securities or REIT inter-
ests.  26 U.S.C. § 721(b) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1996).  Other
Subchapter “K” specific rules may force the contributors to recognize their built in gain.  26
U.S.C. §§ 704(c)(A)(i), 737 (2006).  Under 26 U.S.C. § 357(c)(1) (2006), a contribution
transaction can be tax detrimental if debt encumbering the assets exceeds their adjusted
basis, but partnership based transactions allow for management of an analogous issue under
26 U.S.C. § 752 (2006) (which normally permits partners control the amount of debt they are
deemed to shed, and thereby control over whether the contribution results in a taxable event).
196 Depending on the form of the transfer, it may or may not be taxable. Cf. Id. §§ 1001,
351(a), (e), 357(a)-(b)(1)(B) (2006). See infra note 197.
197 See supra text accompanying note 170.  In some cases, complimentary accommodations
supplied to gaming patrons by the destination gaming resort might be limited by the restric-
tions on rental arrangements with related parties.
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party lessee, which could impair the destination gaming resort’s underlying
active business.
Whatever the amount of equity received, the transfer remains generally
taxable.  If the equity received is less than 10%, the destination gaming resort
could act as lessee under an operator lease, deriving the active and passive
business, because the restrictions on rental arrangements with related parties
would not apply.  However, there is a weak business case for such an arrange-
ment, because the lack of control over the REIT represents a potential risk
(even if in possession) and the result of the transaction is merely to interpose a
REIT between the destination gaming resort and the passive business in a taxa-
ble transaction without receiving cash proceeds.
C. Promise of Direct Operation Through Partnership Joint Ventures
Helpfully, administrative guidance,198 suggests a tiered partnership199
arrangement could serve to filter the active and passive assets and income of a
destination gaming resort, with the passive real property transferred for the near
economic equivalent of substantial REIT equity, as a prelude to final monetiza-
tion in a tax efficient transaction, without necessarily impairing the REIT under
the qualification rules or requiring the relinquishment of all, or a portion, of the
active income available at the passive real property to unrelated parties.  More-
over, this arrangement ultimately allows the REIT to engage in direct operation
of the passive real property and the shareholders of the destination gaming
resort to access REIT tax efficiency as to the severed passive business, without
foregoing all or a portion of the active income available.  Surprisingly, this
result appears to hold, notwithstanding that it involves related parties for pur-
poses of the REIT qualification rules and the real property is a lodging property
with gaming.  This outcome results from isolating the active business compo-
nents away from the REIT’s corporate structure, limiting the REIT to owning
passive real property and to direct operation of a purely passive business,200
with active business realized at the severed passive real property by related
parties under a property rights based division201 and the operation and manage-
ment of the passive real property delivered by an independent contractor (who,
198 The term refers to pronouncements like Revenue Rulings (items prepared for a specific
taxpayer that the Internal Revenue Service has determined warrant publication) and Private
Letter Rulings (items prepared by the Internal Revenue Service in response to taxpayer’s
request which are available but not published).  However, neither source carries precedential
weight and cannot bind the Internal Revenue Service, as stated in 26 U.S.C. § 6110(k)(3)
(2006 & Supp. I 2007).
199 A tiered partnership is an ownership arrangement where one partnership (termed the
“parent”) owns a partnership interest in another partnership (termed the “lower-tier partner-
ship”), which may be repeated through multiple tiers of partnerships.
200 As well as customary services that would not give rise to unrelated business taxable
income.  26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(2)-(3), (d)(1)(A)-(B), (d)(2)(C), (d)(7)(C)(ii) (2006 & Supp. II
2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(a)-(b) (as amended in1981). See supra note 168.
201 Without producing impermissible services income, or deriving non-real estate assets
based on active business for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(4)(A), (d)(2)(C), (d)(7)(A)
(2006 & Supp. II 2008).
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as licensee of the destination gaming resort, uses its hospitality brand name),202
using the special tax rules for determining a REIT’s ownership of assets and
income that is isolated in partnership solution, and isolated within a tiered part-
nership arrangement.
Partnerships are very important to REITs. To further their ability to
acquire qualifying assets and income, REITs have developed transactions
allowing them to acquire built-in gain real property, while nonetheless permit-
ting asset owners to receive the near economic equivalent of REIT equity, yet
defer recognition of their built-in gain.  REITs achieve this feat by using rela-
tively liquid partnership interests as consideration.203  These transactions are
commonly called umbrella partnership REITs (hereinafter “UpREIT transac-
tion”) or down REIT partnerships (hereinafter “DownREIT transaction”).204
UpREIT and DownREIT transactions are common because they permit real
property owners to substantially monetize their real property investment with-
out any immediate recognition of built-in gain—that is, on a tax-advantaged
basis—improving their liquidity, diversifying their investment, preserving any
single level tax on the gain, permitting a step-up in basis at death,205 and an
202 Whose equity owners hold no more than 35% of the REIT’s equity, directly and by
attribution of shares. Id. § 856(d)(3), (d)(5) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
203 Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g) (as amended in 1992). See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-08-
019 (Feb. 24, 1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-07-007 (Feb. 17, 1995).  The use of partnership
interests avoids REIT qualification problems from excessive subsidiary corporation securi-
ties value.  Partnership based arrangements could interfere with a REIT’s capacity to meet
the 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)-(d) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) tests if they were regarded as intangible
property.  However, under Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g), a REIT is not deemed to own
intangibles but instead to “own its proportionate share of each of the assets of the subsidiary
partnership, and will be deemed entitled to the income of the partnership attributable to the
income of the partnership attributable to such share . . . [f]or purposes of section 856, the
interest of a partner in the partnership’s assets shall be determined in accordance with his
capital interest in the partnership . . .” (emphasis added).  Helpfully, the REIT qualification
rules’ limitations on the amount of securities owned pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 856(c)(4)(B)
(2006 & Supp. II 2008) generally do not treat partnership interests as securities. Id.
§ 856(m)(3)(A)(i), (m)(4) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(e).  Otherwise, a
look-through approach applies allowing securities held in partnership solution to be deemed
carried by the REIT.  26 U.S.C. § 856(m)(3)(A)(ii) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). See supra note
58.  Finally, the 5-50 Rule’s restrictions on closely held REIT ownership do not apply to
partnerships.  26 U.S.C. §§ 542(a)(2) (2006), 856(a)(6), (h)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008);
Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(b)(6)-(7), (d)(5) (as amended in 1981).
204 UpREIT transactions differ from DownREIT transactions in several important respects.
In a typical UpREIT transaction, the REIT configures one subsidiary partnership into which
it contributes all of its real property assets.  In a DownREIT transaction, the subsidiary part-
nership is formed specifically to hold the built-in gain property of the particular real property
contributors; the REIT’s other real properties are not contributed.  Consequently, in an
UpREIT transaction, the REIT conducts its entire real property business indirectly through
its UpREIT subsidiary partnership, and built-in gain real property contributors end up with
an interest in all the REIT’s real property.  In a DownREIT transaction, the built-in gain real
property contributors end up with an interest in the DownREIT subsidiary partnership that
holds assets distinct from the REIT’s portfolio of real property assets and all pre-transaction
REIT real properties remain at REIT level. See generally SU HAN CHAN, JOHN ERICKSON &
KO WANG, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS: STRUCTURE, PERFORMANCE AND INVEST-
MENT OPPORTUNITIES 48-50 (2003) [hereinafter CHAN, ERIKSON & WANG]; SEMER & ALEX-
ANDER, supra note 123, at A-28.
205 See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 1014, 1022 (2006).
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opportunity to defer recognition of the inherent gain indefinitely.  For REITs,
these acquisitions represent the chance to acquire the real property placed into
partnership solution without using their tax-paid capital and without presently
transferring any REIT stock to the real property owners (avoiding any immedi-
ate additional stock or debt issuance, or acquisition funding issues, and
allowing REITs to fund their future real property acquisitions through partner-
ship interests, as if equivalent to cash).206  Finally, a REIT can use the UpREIT
or DownREIT structure to avoid the 5-50 Rule’s limitation on closely held
REITs, because these limits to do not apply to operating partnerships.207  How-
ever, use of an UpREIT or DownREIT partnership structure is not cost-free,
because partnership accounting and tax rules are complex and costly.208  Also,
a publicly traded REIT’s capital raising activities can be impaired by these
structures, because title to the real property normally remains in the subsidiary
operating partnerships, in order to defer contributors’ taxable gain.209
A REIT’s interest in the assets and income of any UpREIT or DownREIT
operating partnership in which it is a partner (hereinafter “subsidiary partner-
ship”), for the purpose of applying the REIT qualification rules set out in IRC
§ 856(c) and (d), is determined under Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g).210  This long-
standing regulation provides that the REIT is treated as if it directly owned its
proportionate share of all the assets in subsidiary partnership solution and as if
it was entitled to the income of the subsidiary partnership attributable to its
proportionate share of all its assets.  Under recent guidance, a REIT’s propor-
tionate share in a subsidiary partnership’s assets and income, for purposes of
the REIT qualification rules, is the REIT’s capital interest in the subsidiary
partnership, which is determined by dividing the REIT’s IRC § 704(b) com-
puted capital account by the sum of all the capital accounts in the subsidiary
206 CHAN, ERICKSON & WANG, supra note 204, at 50.
207 See supra note 48.
208 CHAN, ERICKSON & WANG, supra note 204, at 50.
209 26 U.S.C. §§ 704(c), 737 (2006).
210 Id. § 856(c)-(d) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). See supra note 120.  Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g)
(as amended in 1992). See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-34-054 (Aug. 23, 2002); Rev.
Rul. 69-40, 1969-1 C.B. 188. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g) (REIT deemed to realize
proportionate share of partnership income and assets) with 26 U.S.C.A. § 512(c) (West,
Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 111-312 effective Dec. 17, 2010).  Tax Reform Act of 1976,
H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1742 (1976) (tax exempt partner
required to include its distributive share of partnership income in computing unrelated busi-
ness taxable income).  Superficially, this special look-through rule for REIT partnerships
(constraining the effect of partnership investments by REITs to its proportionate share for all
purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 856 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)) is at tension with the broad language
of the impermissible tenant services income rule set out in 26 U.S.C. § 856(d)(7)(A) (2006
& Supp. II 2008) (applying to “. . . amounts[s] received or accrued directly or indirectly
. . .”) (emphasis added).  However, Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g) does not purport to modify 26
U.S.C. § 856(d) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); instead, it prescribes how these provisions will
apply when the arrangement is a tax partnership.  Given this unambiguous language and
clear look-through approach prescribed by Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g) (1962), these provisions
do not conflict.  Accordingly, under certain circumstances, it appears that REIT partnerships
permit the ordered separation (and isolation) of REIT undesirable assets and income in a
manner unavailable to non-partnership entities or arrangements.
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partnership.211  Accordingly, a REIT is deemed entitled to realize the tax items
of a subsidiary partnership attributable to its proportionate share of all the sub-
sidiary partnership’s assets, as shown by its relative capital account balance.212
However, the REIT’s actual distributive share of subsidiary partnership tax
items, for tax purposes other than testing assets and income under the REIT
qualification rules, does not need to be proportional to its interest in partnership
capital.213  Consequently, allocations in accordance with partnership interests,
or not in accordance with partnership interests, are permitted, notwithstanding
the REIT qualification rules (subject to the inherent limits of the partnership
capital accounting rules that require a recipient of partnership tax allocations to
enjoy the economic benefit or detriment the allocation represents214).  Signifi-
cantly, a subsidiary partnership that itself owns an interest in one or more
lower-tier partnerships thereby generates assets and income for the REIT, for
purposes of the REIT qualification tests.215  Because the same capital interest
rules apply to determine the upper-tier REIT’s interest in the second-, third-, or
lower-tier partnership’s assets and income for purposes of the REIT qualifica-
tion tests, a REIT is treated as if it directly owned an interest in its far-lower-
tier subsidiary partnership’s assets and income.216  Importantly, since this pro-
portionate share rule establishes the effect of a REIT’s investment in tiered
partnerships for purposes of applying all of I.R.C. § 856, the rules appear to
permit the fracturing of a business otherwise susceptible to being characterized
as producing REIT undesirable lodging income into its component parts (sepa-
rating payments for short term use or occupancy of real property from compen-
sation for personal services or other active business), with REIT undesirable
income all but excluded for purposes of the REIT qualification rules.217
211 Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g); 26 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-100-14
(Mar. 2, 2003).  Although Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g) did not define the term “capital interest”,
in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-100-14, the Internal Revenue Service concluded that the term
“capital interest” referenced a partner’s relative capital account balance, since the capital
accounts of the partners manifest their relative net investment in the underlying partnership.
Accordingly, a partner’s “capital interest” constitutes their capital account balance as a por-
tion of the sum of the aggregate of all capital account balances, from time to time.  Although
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-100-14 limits its conclusions to 26 U.S.C. § 856(c) (2006 & Supp.
II 2008), Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g) supplies a broader reach, because, by its terms, it applies
to the entirety of 26 U.S.C. § 856 (2006 & Supp II 2008).  Prior interpretive guidance did
consider the impact of an investment in customary service delivering partnerships on REIT
qualification, but these pronouncements did not define the term “capital interest” for pur-
poses of Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g).  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-28-018 (July 15, 1994); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-02-037 (Jan. 13, 1995). Cf., 1 WILLIAM S. MCKEE, WILLIAM F. NELSON &
ROBERT L. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS ¶ 9.03[5] (4th
ed. 2009) [hereinafter MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE] (citations omitted).
212 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-100-14; Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(a)-(b) (as amended in
2008).
213 MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 211, ¶ 9-191.
214 Except to the extent the allocations cause it to develop too high or low a relative capital
account balance. Cf., Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(A).
215 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-100-14.
216 Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 856(c) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
217 See Part IV.A.
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D. Structuring Direct Operation Through Partnership Joint Ventures
The REIT qualification rules’ approach to subsidiary partnerships indi-
cates that a destination gaming resort is arguably able to indirectly transfer its
passive real property to a REIT for direct operation—retaining and filtering to
itself the active business income and assets218 the REIT cannot derive or
own—in a way which promises to allow the parties to organize their relation-
ship to seamlessly deliver active business at the passive real property that desti-
nation gaming resort guests demand.219  Additionally, the arrangement would
not directly limit the scale of the business conducted in partnership solution
because the value limits on REIT security ownership do not generally apply.220
However, for this structure to succeed where the destination gaming resort (or
its shareholders) will have, or will acquire, a substantial REIT equity interest
(directly or by attribution),221 the division of the destination gaming resort
property must be based on retaining within the destination gaming resort a
property right based entitlement222 to derive active business at the destination
218 That is, by keeping the active real property, while severing and transferring only the
passive real property.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 97 and 123.  However, there must be sufficient pas-
sive income in the subsidiary partnership, relative to the amount of active income filtered out
of the lower-tier partnership, to permit the REIT to derive no more than de minimis active
income from the property, after application of Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g).  Even with the
majority of the income available at the passive real property being passive and nearly all
active income being diverted to the destination gaming resort, the partnership agreement will
require careful crafting, but it does not appear that the REIT will inadvertently realize too
much active business is necessarily a significant risk. See supra text accompanying notes 7-
8.  If it was, the destination gaming resort may have to move its active real property associ-
ated with the resort out of the lower-tier partnership.  Because impermissible tenant services
income is determined on a property-by-property basis, a REIT’s transfer of unrelated passive
real properties to the subsidiary partnership would be ineffective in diluting or limiting its
active income at the property to below de minimis amounts. See supra note 95.
220 See supra note 58.
221 If the equity interest is sufficient to disqualify the rental income under the restrictions on
rental arrangements with related parties or the limitations on independent contractors, after
application of the attribution rules, then a property rights based division is optimal. See
supra notes 170 and 188.
222 The partnership’s entitlement to realize active business cannot arise under a lease or
contract arrangement, since either arrangement can activate independent contractor problems
and/or the restrictions on rental arrangements with related parties, if the equity interest
received in the REIT (actually or constructively) is large enough.  In contrast, if a retained
property right based entitlement to realize active business at the passive real property is used
(such as an easement in gross), it does not activate the leasehold based restrictions (because
it is merely a non-possessory right in real property entitling its holder to the use or enjoy-
ment of the REIT’s land for specified purposes).  Modern law has expanded the use of
easements; though possessory, easements are not estates in land, but are interests in land.  An
easement: (i) is an interest in land in the possession of another; (ii) is an interest of a limited
use or enjoyment of the land in which the easement exists; (iii) can be protected against the
interference of third-parties; (iv) cannot be terminated at the will of the possessor of the
servient land; (v) is not a normal incident of a possessory land interest; and (vi) is capable of
creation by conveyance.  4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 34.01-34.03 (Michael Allen
Wolf ed., 2004) (citations omitted).  State law normally treats easements as an interest in real
property that give the holder a property right based entitlement to use the real property of
another. See also MARK LEE LEVINE & LIBBI LEVINE SAGEV, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:
TAX PLANNING AND CONSEQUENCES 61-62 (2010).  It is important to note, however, that
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gaming resort and/or at the passive real property.  Here, the ideal arrangement
appears to be an exclusive perpetual easement over the passive real property
(retained by the destination gaming resort until it is optimal to transfer this item
to the lower-tier partnership).  In this way, the property contributed to the sub-
sidiary partnership never includes the right to derive active business at the
underlying passive real property; only the balance of the bundle of rights end
up in the subsidiary partnership through which the REIT conducts direct opera-
tion of the purely passive and customary services aspects of the passive real
property.223  Consequently, the destination gaming resort’s contribution of real
property to the subsidiary partnership is less than its complete bundle of rights,
retaining within itself, in the form of a property right, the right to derive active
business.224
So arranged, the right of the destination gaming resort (or any other part-
nership it contributes this property to) to derive income from active business at
the property depends on its retained property rights, not a contract or leasehold
based relationship with the subsidiary partnership or REIT.  Using a property
right based arrangement is important because conventional structures225 for
while the tax consequences of a business arrangement are influenced by its attributes under
local law, local law is not controlling.  However, a retained easement as to active business in
a tiered partnership that filters active business away from the REIT is analogous to the co-
ownership  arrangement described in Rev. Rul. 74-353, 1974-2 C.B. 200 (holding the rents
untainted by a co-owner’s realizing income from submetering electricity, provided the REIT
derived no direct or indirect income or benefit therefrom).
223 Rev. Rul. 67-218, 1967-2 C.B. 213 (an easement has been viewed as a non-possessory
real property interest for tax purposes).  Given the broad definition of real estate assets for
purposes of the Assets Test, the bundle of rights (after reduction for an easement) should
constitute a real estate asset in the hands of the subsidiary partnership through which the
REIT derives qualifying income. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(d).  Notably, the REIT could
manage the passive real property business in subsidiary partnership solution, directly, to the
extent its management represents discharging a fiduciary duty, and through a sufficiently
unrelated independent contractor.  Provided the attribution rules did not activate the restric-
tions on substantially related independent contractors, the destination gaming resort (or its
principals or founders) could supply management and operation as an independent contrac-
tor.  See supra note 145.
224 The transfer of an easement to the lower-tier partnership aims to constitute a non-recog-
nition transfer of property to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest, much like
the transfer of the passive real property to the subsidiary partnership, under 26 U.S.C. § 721
(2006).
225 Common structures for dividing or limiting access to, or the business realizable on, real
property, are co-ownerships, partnerships/joint-ventures, contracts or leaseholds. However, a
co-ownership may be a partnership for tax purposes.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as
amended in 2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (as amended in 1995). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-
2 (as amended in 1995).  Even if not, under the doctrine of unity of possession, each co-
owner is deemed to own an undivided interest in all of the property, with the associated right
to possess the whole, and to a proportionate share of all of the rents or profits derived.  7
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 50.01-50.07 (Michael Allen Wolf ed. 2000) (citations omit-
ted). See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2002-22, 2002-14 I.R.B. 733. But see Rev. Rul. 74-353, 1974-2
C.B. 200 (REIT and unrelated corporation were co-owners of real property, no claim of tax
partnership, qualifying rent was untainted by co-owner’s submetered electricity sales to
tenants when arranged to supply no direct or indirect income or benefit to the REIT).  A co-
ownership involving leasing property and supplying services could introduce active income
and assets into the REIT.  26 U.S.C. § 761(a) (2006 & Supp. I 2007); Treas. Reg. § 1.761-
1(a) (1960); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (1967).  Similarly, a partnership would deem
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dividing income realized from a property are frustrated by the REIT qualifica-
tion rules if even modest REIT equity is the consideration.  Helpfully, this
arrangement also has the salutary effect of reducing the risk of inadvertently
introducing into the REIT intolerable active business and assets, which reduces
the imperative that management and control over the subsidiary partnership be
vested exclusively in the REIT.  Simultaneously, severing active business from
the passive real property conveyed through an easement limits the subsidiary
partnership to merely passive business—which partially obviates the need for
the destination gaming resort acquiring a controlling interest in the REIT or
subsidiary partnership—in order to protect its dependent and intertwined active
business, and lessens any objection it has to the REIT acquiring a controlling
interest in the subsidiary partnership.226  Finally, severing the active business
remaining at the passive real property permits the destination gaming resort to
continue or restructure itself to realize its business in tax-efficient form because
the active business is no longer married to capital-intensive passive real prop-
erty, and the need to access capital through a public listing transaction has been
substantially reduced or eliminated.
However, some destination gaming resorts will find such a property rights
based division unworkable or unsatisfactory, as it divides assets in a manner
that is unusual for publicly traded enterprises, introducing uncertainty and risk
that may result in market penalties.  Additionally, whether the passive real
property can generate enough passive business to be distributed to the REIT
justify the amount of REIT investment required to fully monetize the destina-
tion gaming resort’s investment is unclear; it may be the case that the passive
business available cannot support the REIT investment needed to fully mone-
tize it.  However, a more realistic view is that the destination gaming resort
will, on its exit, fully monetize its capital investment in passive real property
because, all things being equal, any difference between the amount of capital
invested in passive real property and the value of the subsidiary partnership
interest received is attributable to the active business it retained.227
each partner to own active assets and realize active income of the partnership in accordance
with their proportionate interest in the partnership, introducing undesirable active assets and
income into the REIT.  Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g).  Moreover, a contract or lease based
arrangement cannot be ones where the independent contractor limits and restrictions on
rental arrangements with related parties activate, which effectively limits the destination
gaming resort to a low equity interest in one of the REIT or active business entities. See
supra note 188. Cf., Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a)(3).  A tiered partnership structure used to filter
active business away from the REIT does not raise the past policy problems of partnership
based arrangements that deliver disqualified income to the REIT concealed primarily as
interest. S. REP. NO. 106-201, at 57 (1999) (describing partnership arrangements involving
REITs permitting them to realize non-qualified income disguised as qualifying interest).
226 Severing the personal services intensive active real property from the occupancy based
passive real property may help the income qualify as rents. See supra Part IV.A.
227 Whether the destination gaming resort can fully recover its investment made in passive
real property depends on the value of the passive real property, after carving out any retained
property rights (such as an exclusive easement as to active business at the passive real prop-
erty).  The value of the passive real property determines the amount the REIT must contrib-
ute and the percentage interest the destination gaming resort will receive in the subsidiary
partnership. See supra note 18.
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This relationship might arise as follows.  First, the REIT and the destina-
tion gaming resort contribute other property or cash and the passive real prop-
erty, respectively, to a subsidiary partnership.228  Essentially, the transaction is
an UpREIT or DownREIT transaction.229  Here, the destination gaming resort
contributes the passive real property components that a REIT is permitted to
own and operate,230 but the contribution would not include legal title to those
portions of the property that yield purely or predominantly active business,
such as the gaming floor (in addition to the carve out of an easement relating to
active business at the passive real property).  If the REIT contributed (or had
previously contributed) cash or equity in other property sufficient to exceed the
net value of the contributed passive real property, the REIT would generally
acquire the largest capital account in the subsidiary partnership (the passive real
estate assets, and tax items attributable thereto, would therefore be deemed
owned and realized predominantly by the REIT, for purposes of the REIT qual-
ification rules).231  The destination gaming resort would separately contribute
its active business assets to a lower-tier active partnership it forms with the
subsidiary partnership, so that it derives almost all of the capital account inter-
228 To ensure that the arrangement qualifies as a partnership for tax purposes, it is important
(among other criteria) that the partnerships each manifestly conduct business for profit or
gain (with their respective partners carrying on joint activities for profit), and divide the
profits as contemplated in 26 U.S.C. § 761(a) (2006 & Supp. I 2007).  Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-1(a)(2) (as amended in 2009). Cf., 26 U.S.C. § 704(e) (2006).  Additionally, the
two-tiered partnerships should not risk being deemed partners of a notional separate lowest
tier partnership, which requires careful planning, including each partnership conducting its
active business or passive business independently of the other and without sharing profits or
losses (or control over the other’s income and capital).  Luna v. Comm’r, 42 T.C. 1067
(1964); W.G. Alhouse v. Comm’r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1678 (1991); D.J. Lausterer v.
Comm’r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2247 (1995); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-17-039 (Apr. 30, 1999);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-28-014 (July 14, 2000).  Finally, the transaction must not activate
the partnership anti-abuse rule.  Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (as amended in 1995); SEMER &
ALEXANDER, supra note 123, at A-31.
229 If a DownREIT transaction is used, the transaction requires careful planning in order to
maintain economic equivalence between the subsidiary partnership interests held by the des-
tination gaming resort and the distributions made on REIT equity. SEMER & ALEXANDER,
supra note 123, at A-30.
230 Using an independent contractor.  CHAN, ERICKSON & WANG, supra note 204, at 50.
231 Because of the way the REIT partner’s interest in partnership solution assets and income
is determined for purposes of the REIT qualification rules under Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3(g),
there is a tax imperative to keep the REIT’s capital account and partnership interest substan-
tially the largest in the subsidiary partnership, if it wants to derive the greatest amount of
qualifying assets and income. Cf., Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv) (as amended in 2008).
Moreover, to avoid the 26 U.S.C. § 857(b)(6)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) prohibited transac-
tion tax (applying at the confiscatory rate of 100%), any allocations from the lower-tier
partnership that constitute inventory type gains should be made to the destination gaming
resort.  While the REIT’s capacity to invest in this transaction is dependent on finely cali-
brating the amount of qualifying income and non-qualifying assets and income it derives out
of the tiered partnership arrangement, it is also important that the arrangement supply the
destination gaming resort and the REIT with the designated economic return on its contrib-
uted assets (for the destination gaming resort, before it fully monetizes its investment).
Achieving the desired economic return and tax consequences requires a sophisticated part-
nership agreement, a discussion that is beyond the scope of this article. Cf., SEMER & ALEX-
ANDER supra note 123, at A-30.
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est in this lower-tier partnership.232  The assets contributed would include the
exclusive property right—such as an exclusive perpetual easement—to conduct
active businesses at the property, the retained purely active business and at least
some active real property.233  Accordingly, the active business assets of the
lower tier partnership, and tax items attributable thereto, would be derived
almost entirely by the destination gaming resort, not the subsidiary partnership,
and therefore not the REIT, for purposes of the REIT qualification rules.234
Through this sequence of transactions, the destination gaming resort
would receive partnership interests in the subsidiary partnership and lower-tier
partnership, although the REIT would receive partnership interests in the sub-
sidiary partnership alone.  Importantly, although the distinct active and passive
real property would be held by affiliated but separate partnerships and not
under lease(s), the delivery of services at the destination resort would be rela-
tively seamless (since personal services are concentrated in the lower tier part-
nership) and not predicated on a contract or a leasehold arrangement.  Through
these partnership contributions, the REIT has acquired passive real estate assets
and qualifying passive income, for purposes of the REIT qualification rules,235
the destination gaming resort has positioned itself to substantially monetize its
investment in its passive real property, able to free up sunk capital when needed
and focus on its underlying active businesses.  The parties deliver a consistent
guest experience and are not compelled to forgo realizing active business other-
wise available.  Instead, active business is realized by the destination gaming
resort, through its interest in the lower-tier active partnership, where it or its
shareholders’ equity position in the REIT would preclude its qualifying as an
independent contractor or would activate the restriction on rental arrangements
with related parties.  However, even though the REIT is limited by this direct
operation arrangement to realizing strictly passive income at the passive real
property, the subsidiary partnership would rely on an independent contractor to
manage and operate the passive real property.236
E. When Additional Restructuring is Required for Improved Tax Efficiency
Normally, transferring its passive real property aspects to a REIT will not
itself improve the tax efficiency of an existing publicly traded destination gam-
232 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-34-054 (Aug. 23, 2002); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-100-14
(Mar. 7, 2003).  Here, the REIT, through the subsidiary partnership, would contribute cash or
property of relatively little value to the active lower-tier partnership. See supra note 212.
233 Real property assets such as the gaming floor, and the property right to derive active
business at the passive real property now in subsidiary partnership solution. See supra note
212.
234 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-100-14 (the items in the lower-tier partnership(s) would be
deemed to be assets and income of the destination gaming resort nearly alone).
235 The subsidiary partnership would use an independent contractor for any management it
engaged in beyond what it is permitted to do in discharge of its fiduciary duties.  26 U.S.C.
§ 856(d)(7)(C)(i) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). See supra Part IV.A.
236 Presumably including using the destination gaming resort brand name under license.
Here, the owners of the independent contractor cannot own more than 35% of the REIT. See
supra note 145.
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ing resort.237  Until the subsidiary partnership interests received by a publicly
traded destination gaming resort are distributed to its shareholders, the arrange-
ment is not directly any more tax efficient than the pre-transaction arrangement,
because the destination gaming resort will be subject to a corporate level tax on
the income and gain items it is allocated from the subsidiary partnership.238
Consequently, increasing the tax efficiency of a publicly traded destination
gaming resort requires a distribution of the subsidiary partnership interests
received to its shareholders, because doing so eliminates the corporate level tax
on all future allocations and distributions made by the subsidiary partner-
ship.239  By making this distribution, a publicly traded destination gaming
resort would recognize any gain it had in the partnership interests it distrib-
uted,240 unless the distribution qualified for non-recognition.241  The sharehold-
ers, in turn, would recognize the distribution as a dividend, return of capital, or
capital gain, depending on the value of the property distributed, the corpora-
tion’s earnings and profits, and the shareholders’ adjusted basis in their
shares.242  After any such distribution, it is possible for the subsidiary partner-
ship to become a disregarded entity, if the REIT acquires all of the interests
therein (effectively from conversion or puts of subsidiary partnership
interests).243
F. Optimal Candidates For Direct Operation Partnership Joint Ventures
For some destination gaming resorts, the arrangement presents an
underwhelming business case, because the amount of income that would be
237 When it is a taxable corporation, such as a publicly traded destination gaming resort.
See supra note 23.
238 26 U.S.C. §§ 702(a), 11(a) (2006) (tax items allocated from the subsidiary partnership,
and the lower-tier partnership, will be reported on the destination gaming resort’s tax return
as if it had realized those items itself. The arrangement has, however, monetized its passive
real property investment). See supra note 23.
239 Those derived from the passive assets and passive income placed into partnership solu-
tion.  It could also drop its public listing and restructure out of Subchapter “C”.
240 26 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2006).  This could also trigger a partnership termination. Id.
§§ 708(b)(1)(B) (2006), 761(e) (2006 & Supp. I 2007). See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-32-
026 (Aug. 13, 1993).
241 Cf., 26 U.S.C. §§ 355 (2006 & Supp. I 2007), 368(a)(1)(D) (2006).
242 Unless the distribution qualified for non-recognition treatment. See supra note 243.
However, where the real property based business is not a “C” corporation but a tax pass-
through (such as a “S” corporation or tax partnership), it is then unnecessary, from a tax
perspective, to transfer the subsidiary partnership interests to the destination gaming resort’s
equity holders, as in all cases, only one level of taxation applies.
243 Here, the subsidiary partnership would disappear into the REIT and, for REIT qualifica-
tion purposes, the lower-tier partnership would become the subsidiary partnership.  Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-3(f)(2) (as amended in 2006); Rev. Rul. 99-6, 1999-1 C.B. 432.  However,
provided the REIT’s relative capital in the lower-tier active partnership remained low, the
disappearance of the subsidiary partnership as a separate entity would not introduce signifi-
cant active assets or income of the lower-tier partnership into the REIT.  This event would
terminate the destination gaming resort’s control or influence over the passive real property,
if its shareholders held a less than controlling interest in the REIT; this may not prove harm-
ful given the risk reduction owing to a property right based entitlement to derive all active
income at the passive real property.  In some cases, conversion may give rise to a disguised
sale. Cf., 26 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006).
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diverted into the tax efficient REIT or subsidiary partnership is limited to the
strictly passive business aspects of the resort (not all the active and passive
income available) and may require the limited use of a substantially unrelated
independent contractor for operation.  Moreover, the direct operation arrange-
ment may be unwelcome for existing publicly traded destination gaming resorts
because it requires an unconventional and novel tiered, partnership based split
up and property rights based restructuring, which may disturb firm capital and
debt-raising.  In this case, they may prefer a simpler sale-leaseback for cash.
For those destination gaming resort businesses that are not yet publicly
listed, the arrangement may be attractive because it allows a partial exit, per-
mitting the business to hold its valuable active business components, such as
the gaming business, in a tax-efficient, non-public structure while ultimately
securing a tax efficient exit from much of its capital-intensive passive real
property investment.244  Importantly, the structure does not force the destina-
tion gaming resort to subject its valuable active business to taxation under Sub-
chapter “C,” because it allows business founders to avoid undertaking (or
potentially reverse) a publicly listing transaction.  Because the active real prop-
erty is substantially less capital intensive, the need to directly access the capital
markets is reduced.  The arrangement would permit business founders to retain
a substantial interest in future passive real property appreciation, through their
direct or indirect interest in the REIT, if they forego monetization of all or
some of their interest received while accessing REIT tax efficiency.  Signifi-
cantly, founders of yet to become publicly listed destination gaming resorts
could support some of their estate-planning goals by converting the illiquid
capital-intensive passive real property components of their destination gaming
resort to liquid partnership interests or liquid REIT equity, allowing their
estates to fund any federal estate taxes from liquid assets, rather than by illiquid
interests in a private destination gaming resort.245
V. CONCLUSIONS
Destination gaming resorts demand massive amounts of capital in order to
fund their investment in real property, much of which comprises areas where
they realize predominantly passive business, including the hotel tower.  Conse-
quently, they generate substantial income from passive business, such as fees
for hotel occupancy, even as most of their income is attributable to active busi-
ness, such as gaming and personal services.  Because they blend separable pas-
sive and active real property, a REIT can theoretically acquire all or some of
the real property, realizing income under an operator lease with a substantially
unrelated gaming or hotel lessee.  Alternatively, a REIT can acquire only the
passive real property aspects, limiting itself to passive income from direct oper-
ation.  Unfortunately, investment in these properties is subject to gaming prop-
244 For instance, real property based business founders could hold subsidiary partnership
interests convertible into liquid REIT stock, but retain substantially all of an active business
conducted in the lower-tier partnership (in a tax efficient structure, such as a pass-through).
245 If all the partnership interests in the subsidiary partnership were quickly shifted into
REIT equity or cash, the arrangement would not achieve significant tax deferral. In this case,
the sale-leaseback transaction described in Part IV.B. may prove superior.
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erty specific limits that prevent REITs from operating or leasing the hotel to its
taxable subsidiaries.
The demand for capital investment in real property poses a significant bus-
iness challenge to destination gaming resorts, something they often address by
becoming publicly traded and through borrowing, condominium-hotel develop-
ments or sales of resort retail components.  Under the theory of tax capitaliza-
tion, the inherent tax efficiency of REITs position them as an ideal acquirer for
a capital-intensive passive real property.  Notwithstanding their annual distribu-
tion requirement, REITs are generally well capitalized, as they tend to be pub-
licly listed.  Despite this, closer examination reveals that a conventional REIT
transaction would be disadvantageous.  In particular, a REIT cannot engage in
direct operation without forgoing profitable personal services based active busi-
ness at the property (resorting to a substantially unrelated independent contrac-
tor or independent service provider, because they cannot isolate remaining
active business into, or lease the property to, a taxable REIT subsidiary).  Alter-
natively, a REIT may use an operator lease, where it forgoes all the active and
passive business directly realizable (some of which is recovered in the fair mar-
ket rent).  Here, because the active and passive businesses at the property are
dependent and intertwined, the destination gaming resort is the optimal lessee.
To avoid contaminating the income, the destination gaming resort and its share-
holders cannot hold substantial REIT equity.
If the REIT instead engages in direct operation, one recent ruling implied
that income from short-term occupancies like hotels may be non-qualifying.
Such a position would overturn the historic recognition that hotel income com-
prises both qualifying and non-qualifying income.  Although this ruling is diffi-
cult to reconcile with other pronouncements, it is a concern.  However,
administrative guidance on the consequences to REITs of investing in partner-
ships has answered many tax uncertainties, to the extent that such guidance can.
Taken together, these pronouncements suggest that a tiered partnership arrange-
ment can be used to sever the passive real property in exchange for the
equivalent of substantial REIT equity, permitting the equivalent of direct opera-
tion without introducing economic or business penalties, notwithstanding that
there is gaming, provided the destination gaming resort retains a property based
right to realize the active business available (such as a perpetual easement).
The complexity, risk and novelty of such a transaction may be unattractive to
existing publicly traded destination gaming resorts and there may not be
enough income at the severed passive real property to justify the REIT invest-
ment required to ultimately monetize the resort’s existing investment.  How-
ever, closer scrutiny reveals that any shortfall between the total capital invested
and the value of the partnership interest received is attributable to the retained
active business assets.  Such a division may be helpful, as it isolates REIT
desirable passive business from undesirable personal services, permitting direct
operation while more closely situating the arrangement within the historic treat-
ment of passive components of hotel income as qualifying.
Significantly, for those enterprises that are private but would otherwise
become publicly traded, severing the business’ passive real property in this way
permits them to retain a tax efficient arrangement but access REIT tax effi-
ciency as to their passive real property (before final monetization).  The trans-
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action preserves the business’ ability to realize active business, while
permitting it to remain privately held and organized in tax efficient structures
other than Subchapter “C.”  Additionally, the arrangement positions the desti-
nation gaming resort to monetize all or some of its capital investment when it
deems it optimal to do so, something that may be particularly welcome consid-
ering the estate planning goals of founders.  For these reasons, the transaction
softens the burden of capital-intensive passive real property but avoids a tax
detrimental public listing transaction.
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